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The objective of this thesis is the determination of the extent of the
owner's liability in the event of an injury to a construction contract worker.
The existing environment of jobsite safety is reviewed and a case study,
where the owner of the contracted facility is a major university, is
considered. The framework of liability surrounding the employer is
investigated with emphasis on interpretation of Pennsylvania statutes and
case law. The framework of liability surrounding a third party is
investigated with emphasis on the construction contract environment. The
two frameworks are contrasted and an investigation is made of the
conditions that determine whether the owner is liable as an employer or as a
third party. The conditions are summarized as two sets of specific criteria.
The two sets of criteria are applied to the case study university as a
laboratory example. Recommendations for predicting or controlling liability
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THE CONSTRUCTION INJURY LIABILITY ISSUE
Introduction
With increasing awards to individuals injured in the workplace and
the growing use of the "deep pockets" approach to recovery in lawsuits, it is
important that owners of constructed facilities understand their
responsibility for workplace injuries and how to control their liability during
the construction phase. Even a single mistake in this arena can cost
hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars in addition to the human
suffering that could have been prevented.
The owner desiring a facility contracts with one, or more, contractors,
each of whom may also subcontract various portions of the facilities
construction. This combination of multiple contractors on the site, none of
whom are the eventual owner or user of the facility, along with the current
state of the art of workmen's compensation laws has created a veritable
judicial minefield for the owner administering multiple construction
contracts.
Using Penn State as the "laboratory example," this thesis examines the
need for, and provides recommendations about construction contract
administrative procedures that properly delineate responsibility and
minimize erroneous placement of liability. This is accomplished by an
investigation of the current construction safety conditions, climate of
litigation, workmen's compensation legislation, judicial decisions relating to

the owner as "employer" or as "third party," and the rules of law. The
circumstances and conditions upon which these determinations pivot is also
examined.
Background
The subject of Construction Safety has been increasingly recognized as
a vital part of the process leading to the successful completion of
construction projects. Numerous books and articles have been written
extolling the virtues of safety on the construction site. However, accidents
are still occurring. Along with the continued search for ways to best reduce
the rate of occurrence of accidents, there is an obligation to consider a proper
response to accidents which occur and cause injury.
An important part of the response relates to defining responsibility
and assessing damages. We live in a society that recognizes the assumption
of certain responsibilities by the individual for others. The failure to
properly discharge those responsibilities and thus have an injury result, is
believed to be sufficient reason to assign an obligation to the irresponsible
party to pay for the unfortunate occurrences costs.
The Liability Environment
The determination of responsibility, because it is not always equally
obvious to all the parties involved, has often become a matter that must be
settled by the courts. Unfortunately, the differing circumstances and the
vagaries of interpretation by numerous individual judges have left many of

the affected parties with some doubt about what their responsibility will be
in future situations. The rapid growth in recent years of the monetary value
awarded to the injured party in cases of negligence and failed responsibility
has added to the urgency of the situation.
Thus, an environment exists where owners recognize their
vulnerability to being judged the responsible or liable party, but do not have
a clear delineation of when or under what circumstances this may occur.
The penalty for guessing wrong in the current litigious climate can be very
steep and may exceed a company's or organization's ability to pay and still
remain solvent.
Parties considering themselves vulnerable often carry increasing
levels of insurance to protect themselves against a financially disastrous
determination in the courts. However, this places the burden of resolving
the same question upon the insurance companies who characteristically
respond to unknown levels of risk by raising their premium rates to cover
themselves. The organization at risk in the first place now finds itself paying
hefty sums in advance of any error on its part. These sums can be large and
are increasingly becoming so great a burden that smaller companies are
finding they cannot afford to do business. Larger companies and
municipalities are likewise being strained by the size of the premiums and
may feel they are effectively subsidizing the mistakes of others.
The above situation is particularly critical for owners who operate
with, and are responsible for. the disbursement of large amounts of
maintenance and construction funds. The responsibility to the worker and
the passers-by carries with it both a moral and a financial obligation for
safety. Due care must be given to how these funds are administered. The

building contracts must be paid for and all contingencies covered as well.
Additionally, on the more personal level, the past failures of some officials
who have betrayed their trust have lead to a recent movement in the
judicial system of holding the individual official personally responsible in
some tort actions.
The Legal Identity of the Owner
Defining the responsible individual involves establishing the legal
identities of the involved parties. It is crucial, in the owner's attempts to
reduce legal vulnerability, that the various legal identities or roles in the
proceedings are understood. Most important are the roles that the owner
may have to assume.
This question of the proper legal identity of the owner, following a
construction injury, will be pursued as the central theme of this thesis. A
diagram of the flowchart showing the general relationships that will be
developed is presented in Figure 1 . While these relationships are not
documented until later chapters, an early appreciation for the central
question and general direction of the research is believed to be useful in
assisting the reader in his interpretation of the authors presentation.
One method of defining the roles of the parties is through the language
of the contract. Increasing attention has been given to the documents that
form the agreements between parties where safety can become an issue.
These documents, and the roles they define, are a primary source used by
the courts to determine culpability and responsibility. Therefore, it is in
everyone's best interest if these documents are clear and precise at the start,
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Figure 1. Overall Concept Flowchart

so that no disagreement about responsibility can exist. Unfortunately, this is
not yet the case in most construction contracts. However, many of the
alternatives that have been tried are already tested in court. These
alternatives are examined throughout this thesis for their effect on defining
the owners role and reponsibility.
Introduction to the Laboratory Example
Part of this research effort was identified as a snapshot look at the
existing vulnerability of an owner and the subsequent development of
recommendations to that "laboratory example" owner. This included an
application of the principles that were investigated in this thesis. The
laboratory example owner chosen for use in this thesis was Penn State.
The Office of Physical Plant (OPP) at Penn State has recently been
reorganized to include a separate "Construction Contracts Management"
division. This division is responsible for the review, award, administration
and inspection of construction contracts at the university. The division has
been organized in a fashion similar to an Army Corps of Engineers contracts
office or a Navy Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) contracts office.
Along with many other concerns, this owner is interested in resolving the
issue of safety responsibility on the part of the university and proper
placement of liability in their contract documents so that construction
accidents are minimized and restitution to the injured will not produce any
unforeseen financial burdens to the university.
Because the university may be viewed as having "deep pockets." a
poorly written clause in a construction contract could conceivably divert the

safety responsibility onto the university when it should more properly
reside elsewhere. This situation hurts the university and the public as well,
since it is the publics taxes that may ultimately pay for any judgement
against the university. Therefore it is important that the university's
contract documents minimize the possibility of erroneous placement of
liability on the university.
However, there is evidence that no owner can ever shed all
responsibility for safety in a project even when only indirectly connected.
Knowledge of the amount of liability that must be assumed in the exercise of
that appropriate level of responsibility is important because it affects
planning budgets and insurance coverages. It is currently unclear what that
level is for construction contracts, and how that responsibility, once
identified, should be most properly discharged.
Problem Statement
The liability of owners who are constructing facilities is not well
defined in the event of an injury to a construction worker. The owner may
be liable under workmen's compensation statutes or liable in a "third party"
tort action. The current literature does not contain a comprehensive
definition of the extent of this liability and the factors that determine it.
Penn States new Construction Contract Management Division desires
to have safe construction sites and can employ inspectors to help in this
regard. It does not, however, want to assume liability that is not rightfully
its own. Managers in charge have expressed an interest in the extent of the

8sufficiency of the wording in their current documents. If it is inappropriate,
they are interested in suggested revisions.
Thesis Objectives
The objectives of this thesis are threefold:
First, to develop the legal principles as determined by current case
law and statute that define and determine the Owner *s responsibility and
liability for a construction contract accident that results in a personal injury.
Second, to develop, from the case law investigation, those options
which the owner can use in its contract documents and procedures to allow it
to exercise proper responsibilities for safety on the project without unduly
exposing itself to liability that should be assumed by another party.
Third, to apply these principles to the existing construction contract
environment at Penn State in the summer of 1989 and indicate the practical
results that can be expected under current conditions.
Methodology
This research was initiated with a comprehensive literature search.
Penn State was chosen as the location for the field study and an original
safety survey form was developed using OSHA as the guideline. The safety
survey was conducted at 4 Penn State construction sites for a total of 36 site

9visits. Additional data on current operations were obtained from meetings
with Penn States Office of Physical Plant (OPP) personnel and Penn States
lawyers.
A comprehensive search of existing case law and statutes was
performed. The search concentrated on the areas of constuction safety,
workmen's compensation, liability, negligence and definitions of 'employer.''
The results of this search were used to develop the models and criterion
tests presented in this thesis.
The models and criterion tests were applied to current operations at
Penn State. Recommendations were developed based on the models,
criterion tests, safety survey results and estimates of current operations
established in the initial meetings. The recommendations were extended to
the general case.
Silence in Current Safety Management
Literature on the Issue of Liability
The state of the art in safety management is much improved over
what it was 50 years ago. The efforts of OSHA and management experts
have resulted in the introduction of guidelines and techniques that have
proven effective in reducing workplace injuries. Concurrently, worker
awareness of hazards has increased, further reducing the occurrence of
injuries. However, the most recent and current publications are still deficient
in addressing the post-injury problems of compensation and liability.
Several excellent references are currently published that cover the
hazard identification and program implementation arenas in exhaustive
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detail. Of particular note is David Goldsmith's Safety Management in
Construction and Industry (1987). Goldsmith concentrates on a "hands-on"
approach to program implementation and includes numerous practical
examples and several checklists that can be modified for a particular
construction site's conditions. Also of note are Robert Firenze's book on The
Process of Hazard Control (1978) and Keith Denton's Safety Management:
Improving Performance ( 1 982). Firenze includes a section on product
liability that includes definitions of some legal terms. However, there is no
further development of legal applications to construction safety and liability.
Denton makes a strong case for the ability of the trained safety professional
to manipulate human behavior patterns. Regardless of whether you agree
with the ethical questions raised by his "safety professional versus the
sheep" approach, it is clear again that the existing research and informed
opinion are written to emphasize management attention as the tool for
achievement of a safe jobsite. After this point is made the injury issue is
ignored, as if sufficient attention to prevention could eventually eliminate all
injuries.
The Stanford Studies
Several safety studies were performed in the 1970s by Stanford
University and published as technical reports distributed by the Construction
Institute. While all are excellent sources of construction management
information, all are silent on the liability issue.
Lance William deStwolinski. working under the guidance of Clarkson
Oglesby, published Occupational Health in the Construction Industry.
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(1969a). The report addressed the hazards facing the construction worker,
with a special emphasis placed on the increased hazards brought about by
modern methods with their increased use of power machinery and corrosive
chemicals. It was intended to serve as a "call to action" for the industry and
the author hoped it would generate increased awareness and better
occupational health and safety programs.
An additional report, A Survey of the Safety Environment of the
Construction Industry (1969b). was published by deStwolinski six months
later and consists of the raw data collected by his survey efforts in support
of the previously published report (1969a). This report contains the survey
responses of Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 and is the foundation
work for the development of deStwolinski's contention that better safety
programs were needed in the construction industry.
Raymond E. Levitts doctoral dissertation was published as Technical
Report No. 196, The Effect of Top Management on Safety in Construction
(1975). Using the perspective that 80% of all accidents are the result of
unsafe acts rather than unsafe conditions, he proposed that top management
could improve safety significantly by making a larger investment in job
training programs.
Jimmie Hinze published a similar report focusing on middle
management (1976). However, his conclusions were as nebulous as the
definition of the role of a "middle" manager and in the authors opinion
consisted largely of an exhortation to get more involved.
Perhaps the best of the three-part series on effects of management on
safety is Nancy Samelson's The Effect of Foremen on Safety in Construction
(1977). In this report Nancy Samelson develops specific criteria that are
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indicative of successful, safe foremen and further reinforces her conclusions
with several case studies. She concludes that the methods employed by the
foreman should reduce crew stress while he shoulders the responsibility of
carefully shepherding new workers and providing everyone with a specific
set of job rules that provide for safe and effective practices.
Michal Robinson developed a method of accounting for the costs of a
construction accident and for assigning it to the person or group responsible
(1979). It was hoped that this would provide managers with both positive
and negative incentives to promote safety in their jobsites.
Finally. Technical Report No. 260, Improving Construction Safety
Performance: The User's Role, by Levitt, Parker and Samelson (1981),
prepared as part of the Business Roundtable Construction Industry Cost
Effectiveness Project, addressed the direct and indirect costs of construction
accidents and outlined some thoughts about the selection of a safety
conscious contractor.
The Stanford efforts highlighted the existing problems in safety
management in the construction industry and identified the fact that there is
considerable room for improvement. However, the only mention of the
liability issue was in connection with a brief acknowledgement of workmen's
compensation. Third party claims were not addressed, except in Report No.
260 (Levitt, Parker and Samelson, 198 1 ), which specifically noted that it




Briefly confirming that stance in recent academic literature are Naoto
Narahara (1988) and William A. Stanton (1988). Both reports, published at
Penn State, focus on management actions to promote safety and neither
addresses the liability concern. Also continuing this trend in the academic
arena is the book by Donald Barrie and Boyd Paulson (1986). The chapter on
safety continues the focus on management and continues to neglect liability
for an accident.
The Safety Survey
The research plan for this thesis required observations related to an
owner who was conducting major amounts of construction in a reasonably
routine fashion. This was necessary in order to verify that the status quo,
even if it had not been the cause of a litigious accident in the past, was
indeed still vulnerable to that occurrence in the near or even immediate
future.
A major assumption made by the author is that current contract
administration procedures do not fully address the owners liability question
and thus leave the owner more vulnerable to litigation following an injury
than perhaps it should be. Of particular note is the situation at Penn State.
The standard construction contract provisions (1989) specify that the




It was felt that prior to performing the research it was necessary to
verify that there was a sufficiently large enough problem to make the
investigation worthwhile. Due to its geographical proximity and the
immediate availability of several active construction sites, Penn State was
chosen as the most desirable area for the survey, assuming that it fit the
profile needed for the thesis's purpose.
Penn State fit the above requirements. The Office of Physical Plant at
Penn State continuously administered multiple maintenance and
construction contracts with relatively large dollar values. Construction was
currently ongoing and the standard contract form was silent, except for the
codes and OSHA reminder, about both safety and liability. It could have
been by oversight or it could have represented a deliberate attempt to
distance Penn State from liability by avoiding any administrative recognition
of its likelihood. In either case the situation was ideal for the investigation
of the problem upon which this thesis was based.
The Safety Survey Objective
Should the survey discover that recognized safety problems were in
existence, then by extension an accident was possible in the short-term
future. This would then raise the question of liability. The contract
documents being silent on this issue would then force the conclusion into the
arena of existing legislation and case law. It could then be concluded that
the question was worthy of investigation since an adverse decision could cost
the loser hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. If, on the other
hand, the survey found that there were no significant safety problems in
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existence then either Penn State was a poor experimental example, or the
subject was not practical as a thesis topic.
Safety Survey Results
As expected, the survey revealed that numerous significant safety
hazards were commonplace on the job sites surveyed. The conclusion of
contributive worth of this thesis was verified and the issue of the owner
liability question was deemed worthy of investigation. That discussion
continues in Chapter 2.
Detailed information on the survey is contained in the appendices of
this thesis. A blank survey form (reduced to 80% size because of publication
limitations) is contained in Appendix A. The development and use of the
survey is covered in Appendix B. The results of the survey, by site and by
survey category, are discussed in Appendix C. Lastly, an example of a
completed survey form (also reduced to 80% size) is included as Appendix D.
A cautionary note is in order. The survey form was developed as part
of the academic exercise of this thesis process. The reader is warned that it
is not presented as a safety or management tool. It was effective for its
purpose but that is now complete. Any further use of this form by any
reader of this thesis is not recommended. The author specifically does not





The authors intent in Chapter 1 is to introduce the reader to the general
environment of construction contract injury liability. Concurrently, a major
focus of the chapter is demonstrating the current lack of definitve
information regarding the owners construction injury liability. This lack of
information coupled with the daily possibility of serious injury on
construction sites establishes the need for research in this area. This need is
reviewed below. The remainder of the thesis attempts to make a significant
contribution in addressing this need.
Safety management literature includes numerous published methods
for developing programs and attempting to motivate participants, but almost
nothing has been published referring to the owners liability in the event of
a personal injury. At the same time, OSHA has a large definitive body of
regulations that defines work standards, but is silent on responsibility,
except to designate the employer as the one who must apply the standards.
The current legal climate apparently differentiates between the
employer and third parties and allows varying liability that may be not
limited to who was most at fault. Along with that, the circumstances
defining the owner as either the employer or a third party are not clear.
A study of 4 job sites in the "laboratory example" indicated that
numerous hazardous situations routinely existed. The contract provisions for
these four job sites only addressed safety responsibility and liability to the
extent that, in two short paragraphs, the contractor was advised of his
responsibility to comply with local codes and OSHA.

17
The contention that a significant enough problem exists was proven
with the site study. Therefore, it is concluded that the questions posed by




WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND THE
LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER
Introduction
This chapter discusses the liability of the employer, which is one of
the two legal roles in which the owner may find itself. In the "employer
role" the liability is closely controlled by statute. Each state has a different
set of statutes that control this liability, even though there are similarities
due to standardization created by federal legislation.
Because of the "state emphasis'" this chapter will primarily focus on
the workmen's compensation and statutory regulation which relate to case
laws and interpretations in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. A
flowchart which defines the principles developed in this chapter is provided
in Figure 2.
The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act
Until 1915, the Constitution in Pennsylvania did not allow any
limitation of an individual's right to recover for injuries or damages to
property. An amendment was passed in 1915 which allowed for the
establishment of a Workmen's Compensation Act. An excerpt from that
amendment stated, "The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the
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Figure 2. Employer Liability Model
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compensation for injuries to employees arising in the course of their
employment" 1915 PL. 1103.
The current statute in force is the Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation Act, Act No. 281. 1939 P.L. 520, with it's various re-
enactments and amendments. The original act was first passed on June 2,
1 9 1 5. as Act No. 338, 1915 P.L. 736. It was amended June 3rd. 1 9 1 5 and
again on April 7, 1921. The original act was repealed when a new act was
signed on June 4, 1937. The new act was not well received, however, and
the original 1915 act was reenacted, along with the repeal of the 1937 act,
on June 21. 1939. 1939 P.L. 520.
The Intention of the Workmen's Compensation Act
The intention of the act is to impose liability without regard for fault,
in order to keep the mitigation of loss due to personal injury out of the
adversarial relationship and delayed resolution situation which is common in
tort actions. By virtue of assigning the liability to the employer, the act also
attempts to make the financial burden of restitution for injury a part of the
cost of doing business. Stated in Rudy v. McCloskey & Co.. 35 A.2d 250. 348
Pa. 401. 1944. "...purpose of the (act) is to provide recompense
commensurate with the damage from accidental injury, as a fair exchange
for relinquishing every other right of action against the employer."
The key item is the concept of the exchange. The individual held
liable under the act is shielded from further actions on the part of the
injured party. The effect is to make the employer shoulder the burden of
liability without regard to fault. This intent is evident even from the short
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title: "An Act defining the liability of an employer for injuries received by
an employee in the course of employment.'*
Examination of the Workmen's Compensation Act
This chapter examines some provisions of the act, specifically those
that pertain to the extent of the liability of the employer. The employer, as
it pertains to the construction industry and this thesis, will most often be the
contractor. The question of when the public owner is or is not the employer
is treated in chapter 4.
Limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act
Several limitations apply that reduce the burden on the employer and
balance the effects of the act. One of the most important limitations is that
the injury must be accidental. In Shatto v. Bardinet Exports. 84 A.2d 388,
170 Pa.Super. 16, 1951. a watchman, with snow-shoveling duties, suffered a
heart attack. He was performing the work in accordance with his duties at
the time of the heart attack. He sued for workmen's compensation. A lower
court found in his favor but the decision was reversed on appeal. The final
ruling was based on the requirement that the "courts must recognize that it
is an act limited to providing compensation for accidental injuries." There




Contravention of Common Law
Additionally, several cases have noted that workmen's compensation
statutes are in derogation or contravention of common law and therefore
must be strictly construed. This was tested in Stevenson v. Westmoreland
Coal Co., 146 Pa.Super. 32, 21 A.2d 468, 1941, where an injured worker
waited too long to access his benefits and the court ruled in favor of the
employer. Otherwise the law becomes too powerful a tool against the
employer, who is without the normal protective and balancing mechanisms
provided in common law. This concept, which becomes more important in
the distinction between employer and third party, is covered in more detail
in Chapter 4.
For the purposes of the employer, the liberal construction limitation is
such that liberality in construction of the statute in favor of the employee is
not intended to fabricate liability for the employer that does not really exist.
As stated in Kransky v. Glen Alden Coal Co. 47 A.2d 645. 354 Pa. 425. 1946,
"That the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor
of injured employees ... killed while at work does not warrant the imposition
of a legal liability thereunder for which no just basis in law exists." However
for the employee who is injured there is no doubt that the statute is to be
interpreted, construed and/or constructed liberally so as to insure the
favorable resolution for the injured employee intended by the drafters of
the legislation.
Because of the contravention of common law inherent in the statute, it
was a given assumption that it would be tested on constitutional grounds.
These tests failed to dislodge the Act. As quoted from a brief which
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addressed this subject, filed in 1939 by Attorney General Bard, " No
provision of any compensation act ever passed in Pennsylvania has ever
been held unconstitutional and the basic validity of this act was upheld in
Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Corp., 255 Pa. 33," Rich Hill Coal Co. v. Bashore,
334 Pa. 449, 1939.
The referenced Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Corp. case actually stated,
"The (Workmen's Compensation Act) ... does not effect a deprivation of
property without the due process of law, in violation of Article I, Section 9 of
the Constitution of Pennsylvania and the fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States."
In 1920, in Qualp v. Stewart Co.. 109 A. 780. 266 Pa. 502. the wording
of the title of the act was deemed to be sufficient guidance with which to
impose liability upon the prime contractor when the employee of a
subcontractor was injured. This opened a whole specialized subclass
involving subcontractors and their duty, or lack of it. as employers.
The Employer as Insurer
Finally, the employers liability should not be construed to be that of
an insurer. In Ginther v. J. P. Graham Transfer Co.. 33 A.2d 923. 348 Pa. 60.
1943, the court found that, "Employer s liability for compensation is found
only in the terms of Workmen's Compensation Act ... employer is not an
"insurer" of life and health of his employees." This was reaffirmed in 1950,
in Cope v. Philadelphia Toilet Laundry & Supply Co., 74 A.2d 775, 167 Pa.
Super. 205. which states. " While ... Act should be liberally construed,
purpose of act is to compensate for accidental injuries and not to insure life
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and health of employees." Note here the confirmation also of the "accidental"
requirement and "liberal construction" inasmuch as it applies to employee
benefits.
Recovery Amounts Provided by the Act
The recovery amounts are specified in section 306(a) for full
disability, basically 66 and 2/3% of wages, and in section 306(b) for partial
disability, 66 and 2/3% of the difference between wages prior to the
disability and subsequent earning power. The December 5. 1974
amendment to the Act, No. 263, P.L. 782, replaced prior wages with the
terminology, "statewide average weekly wage." This average is established
annually, by the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation law.
These amounts are capped by maximum weekly values. A minimum
weekly floor is also provided. These cap and floor amounts are reviewed
annually and occasionally adjusted as needed. For example, the maximum
compensation payment, for full disability, was $30.00 per week in 1952.
1952 P.L. 61. As of 1968 that amount was raised to $52.50 for full
disability. The partial disability remained at $21.25 maximum per week.
Minimum payment for a full disability was at $20.00 during the same time
frame, 1972 P.L. 159. The 1989 weekly maximum, for full disability was
$399.00 per week and the minimum was $13300 as quoted by the Bureau
of Workmen's Compensation toll-free information service. The weekly
maximum and minimum, projected by the same service, for 1990, were
$419.00 and $139.67, respectively

25
Full disability payments continue for 700 weeks and partial disability
payments continue for 350 weeks. Lower values apply if specific body parts
are lost For example, the compensation period for a hand is 175 weeks, a
forearm is 195 weeks and an eye is 125 weeks. Additionally, if the injured
employee has a dependent wife and/or children the compensation period
varies in proportion to the number of dependents, 1974 P.L. 782.
It is evident that the act does not cure all the ills occasioned by an
injury to the family's breadwinner. In fact, it is very likely that expenses
will go up as a result of medically related bills, while income falls somewhat
because of the language of the Act.
The exception would be the low skill-low pay worker, who may see an
increase in actual income if he can be counted as injured, In the region of
Pennsylvania where the author grew up. it was not uncommon for starting
or relatively inexperienced mine workers to develop "back injuries" and
collect money without working.
Rejection of the Act
The employer's liability under the Act is actually somewhat voluntary.
However, the act can not be unilaterally rejected. There must be a prior
agreement, by both parties, in accordance with Section 302(a) of the 1915
Act. confirmed in section 1 of the 1939 Act.
Failing to make provision for such a prior agreement is held as
sufficient cause to find that both parties have accepted the provisions of the
act. This is stated in section 302 as follows. " It shall be presumed that the
parties have accepted ... this act ... unless there be ... an express statement in
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writing from either party to the other, that the provisions of this act are not
intended to apply..." 1939 P.L. 520.
For the contractor, rejection of the act is tantamount to deciding that
he wants to be held liable or blameless as decided by common law tort
criteria. As noted in Figure 2, this has a major impact on the liability
question. However, the Act further reinforces it's own applicability with two
very specific stipulations regarding the assumption of common law liability
as opposed to the employers liability provided for in the statute.
Stipulations Limiting Rejection of the Act
The first of these stipulations comes from section 201 of the 1939 Act
which states that three particular defenses were not available, in a common
law action, to employers who had previously rejected the Workmen's
Compensation Act. These three defenses, ( 1 ) negligence of a fellow
employee, (2) employee assumed the risk when he "voluntarily'' reported for
work, and (3) employee satisfied "contributory negligence" by his own
actions relating to the injury, had been a basis for employers limiting or
eliminating their culpability under common law. By stripping these "unholy
trinity" defenses, the Act made the employer's position, outside the Act.
much more vulnerable.
The second stipulation was provided in the September 29, 1938
amendment to the 1937 Workmen's Compensation Act. This amendment
provided that, " when injury results to an employee in the course of his
employment it shall be presumed that the employer's negligence caused said
injury, which presumption may be rebutted by the employer," 1938 P.L. 52.
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These stipulations make it very risky for an employer to reject the Act
even though the employer has a right to do so. His vulnerability to losing a
tort action is much greater than normal in such cases and he must start out,
in each instance, with the burden of proving himself non-negligent in a
situation where it is already assumed that he is negligent.
Eiclusiveness of Remedy
The important balancing portion of the act is the exclusiveness of
remedy available to the employee against the employer. This is the portion
of the act that prohibits further action against the employer after the
adjudication of liability. This means that the employee can not gain
additional compensation with a tort action against the employer.
The Strategy of Exclusiveness of Remedy
There are 2 important strategy considerations. First, the employer
who has made appropriate arrangements with the company finances or with
an insurance carrier, can be assured of the maximum liability that will be
faced in the event of an accident. The employer is "untouchable" beyond
that point. Secondly, by extension of the fact that only the employer is
covered in this balancing act. the loss of "employer" status and subsequent
findings of culpable negligence could lead to a much higher financial liability
than would be imposed upon the employer under the act.
Therefore, if the owner believes that there will be injuries on the site
and that there is a possibility of liability because of conduct during the
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construction process, then the employer role is likely to be the least risky.
If, however, the owner feels that either ( 1 ) there will be no injuries on the
site or (2) that there can be no after the fact connection establishing
contributory negligence, then the automatic liability of the employer status
would be an unnecessary burden.
Interestingly, the reason "don't expect any injuries on site" is not as
ludicrous as it might first sound. Often a short term subcontractor will
respond in exactly that way and attempt to conduct affairs so that the prime
contractor is the employer. If the owner is wrong and there is an injury,
then the owner would be potentially liable for third party actions (see
Chapter 3). However, some subcontractors have tried to reverse their field
following an injury and cut their losses with a late assumption of employer
status. This options attractiveness has been reduced by the rulings in both
Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, Inc. 404 Pa. 53, 171
A.2d 185. 1961, and Steets v. Sovereign Construction Co. 413 Pa. 458, 198
A.2d 590, 1964. Both of these cases reiterated that " employer who permits
the entry ... of a laborer ... hired by ... a contractor, for the performance upon
such premises of a part of the employers regular business entrusted to that
contractor, shall be conclusively presumed to have agreed to pay to such
laborer ... compensation ...". This language is essentially a restatement of
part of Section 203 of the act itself and will lead to statutory employer
considerations, which are covered later.
Exclusiveness has been tested in several cases. A principal one
involves the Philadelphia shipyard where the land is actually federally
occupied rather than being state land per se. In this case. Capetola v. Barclay
White Co. 139 F.2d 556. 1944, it was pointed out that federal statute
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empowered states to apply workmen's compensation to lands "therein
owned by the United States" and more importantly that the Pennsylvania
statute furnished exclusive remedy" and therefore tort action for negligence
was not maintainable by Capetola.
This finding reaches into the area of jurisdictional disputes and
further reinforces the idea that there is one employer and that the employer
status, once bestowed, is both a requirement to accept liability under the act
and a shield against assumption of any further liability. This remains true
regardless of how confused the lines of authority may be as regards land
ownership or governmental jurisdiction. For the act to apply it is only
necessary for the site to be contained within the Commonwealths borders.
By extension, land ownership by a public entity or township would not
circumvent the normal operation and application of the act.
Cases have also been tried that involved the thought that the
employer, when clearly negligent, should not be allowed to hide behind the
Workmen's Compensation Act and thereby limit his exposure to liability.
However, these attempts have uniformly and consistently failed. In Welsch
v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation. 154 A. 716. 303 Pa. 405, 1931, the
court held that the employee (already established as subject to the Act)
"could not recover for injury in action for trespass..." (the term trespass here
indicates a subgrouping of tort actions) "...though accident resulted from
employer's neglect of statutory duty." This point of law was extended in
Snyder v. I Unterberg & Co. 57 York 92. 1942. to include surviving
dependants, limiting their recourse against the employer to only what would
have been available to the injured worker under the act.
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Lastly, the negligence of a fellow employee cannot be traced back to
the employer through the use of agency, circumventing the employer's
limited liability and thereby opening him up to tort action. This is succinctly
stated in Stern v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. 17 D.& C. 665. 1932, as
"Action ... may not be maintained against plaintiff's employer on ground of
negligence of fellow employee, exclusive remedy being provided by act."
Agency, to the extent that the employer is liable under the Act for the
actions of all his employees, is implied in this opinion. Before applying that
agency concept however, it remains necessary to satisfy both the "accidental"
and "normal course of business" tests to the incident since failing either of
these could place the accident outside the boundaries of the Act.
The Statutory Employer
In a situation where an owner lets a contract to a contractor who then
subcontracts all or part of the work awarded to him. there arises an area of
confusion over who is actually the employer. These cases may involve work
subcontracted by the original subcontractors to additional subcontractors.
The issue revolves around each affected member from the owner to the
sub -subcontractor attempting to have the minimum possible financial
burden. Because of the potentially large sums of money involved, personal
financial interests tend to overcome objective assessments of who is the
employer. The statutes and subsequent case law decisions have attempted
to resolve this issue. In this process they have created and confirmed the
concept of the statutory employer.
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The Scope of the Discussion
In the discussion of the statutory employer we will limit ourselves in
this chapter to the liability that the statutory employer is exposed to and to
the definition of statutory employer as it is defined by the relationship
between contractors/subcontractors. The question of when the owner
becomes the statutory employer is deferred until Chapter 4. However, it
should be noted that in those cases where statutory employer status is
conferred upon the owner, the following effects would still apply.
Identification of the Statutory Employer
The basis for the identification of the statutory employer is found in
the previously cited Qualp v. James Stewart Co. case. This case, which
actually predated some others that have since become more often quoted,
formed the foundation for future representations of the identity of the
statutory employer.
A subcontractor engaged via contract by James Stewart Co., to perform
a portion of the work, engaged a sub -sub-contractor whose employee was
subsequently killed on the job. The court affirmed the prime contractor as
the intended statutory employer by stating the intent of the statutes as
follows. "The legislature wanted to definitely fix some responsible party with
the obligation of paying compensation to injured workmen, and the party
selected was the first whose duty it was to assume control of the work. It
selected the first in succession from the owner, believing the owner would
contract with none but responsible persons. He was the first in the field and
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in the contracting scheme of work, the head of the endeavor, the person to
whom an employee would naturally look. ... The act intended to throw the
burden on the man who secured the original contract from the owner to the
end that employees of any degree doing work thereunder might always be
protected in compensation claims." Therefore, the court laid the basis for
determinations that the prime contractor was uniquely entitled to the
employer status among all the contractors that were working on a site.
The Qualp v. James Stewart case also addressed the extension question
of the status of subcontractors from their perspective. Again, interpreting
the language of the statute the court states, " ...the term "contractor" as used
in ...section 203 and ... section 302... shall include a subcontractor to whom a
principle contractor has sublet any part of the work which the principle
contractor has undertaken." This extended the interpretation above by
deleting the subcontractor from consideration of employer status.
The court went on to define some of the relationship of subcontractors
to their own employees by quoting from section 302 of the Act as follows,
"...the latter clause of section 302 (b), which reads, " It shall not be in effect
between the intermediate employer or contractor and such laborer or
assistant, unless otherwise expressly agreed," indicates legislative intention
to hold the original contractor for compensation liability to the employees of
at least a second contractor." The court found against James Stewart Co. on
the appeal and thus extended the statutory employer role to the third




Challenge to the Interpretation
This would appear to be such a sufficiently strong and clear decision
that it would not be challenged. However, it was challenged and some of the
reason may lie in the actual language chosen for section 203 of the Act.
Partially quoted below, it reads, " An employer, who permits the entry, upon
premises occupied by him or under his control, of a laborer or an assistant
hired by an employee or contractor, for the performance upon such premises
of a part of the employer's regular business entrusted to such employee or
contractor, shall be liable to such laborer or assistant in the same manner
and to the same extent as to his own employee" 1939 P.L. 1 103.
This raises two questions. First, if the employer and contractor are
different, then is the owner the employer? That question will be treated in
detail in Chapter 4. Second, if the employer is not the owner, is the
employer then the contractor? And if so, which one(s) in the case of
subcontractors? Qualp v. James Stewart tackled part of this issue but the
decision was not clear enough to avoid further tests.
These questions led to one of the landmark cases concerning
workmen's compensation in Pennsylvania, McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co.,
302 Pa. 287. 153 A. 424. 1930 . Continuing the interpretation of Qualp v.
James Stewart, but with considerably more attention to detail, the court
defined "employer" as the principal contractor and "contractor", on his
premises, as subcontractor. The court held that Section 105 modified
"contractor" in section 203, so as to exclude a contractor engaged in an
independent business, or an independent contractor, but to include a
subcontractor to whom the principal contractor has sublet a part of the work.

34
The court continued the interpretation stating, "Contractors" as used in
section 105 is synonymous with "subcontractors" although subcontractors
are still regarded as independent contractors under certain conditions."
This interpretation was used in an application to section 203. of the
1915 Act, where this court made a rather famous and oft-quoted
determination. The court "rewrote" the section as follows, "As properly
understood, section 203 would read: "an employer ( principle contractor)
who permits the entry upon premises occupied by him or under his control
of a laborer hired by a contractor ( subcontractor), for the performance
upon such premises of a part of the employers (principle contractors)
regular business entrusted to such contractor ( subcontractor), shall be
liable in the same manner as to his own employee" (the "dots" are directly
from the text of the case). Consequently, this established that the principal
contractor is supposed to be the statutory employer. This is true almost all
the time. However, we shall see in Chapter 4 that the owner can become the
statutory employer in some circumstances.
More recently, (1961 and 1964) this construction of the statutory
language was retested and upheld in both the previously mentioned cases of
Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Patterson-Emerson Comstock and Steets v. Sovereign
Construction Co.
Prerequisites: The 3 -Criteria Test
Despite the obvious focus of intent established by the courts in the
decisions above, several prerequisites apply that must be satisfied before
the statutory employer label may be applied. First, there must be a
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contractual relationship. Second, there must also be "occupation and control
of premises '. Thirdly, the employee must be engaged on part of the
employer's normal business. These 3 criteria form a major part of the basis
of determining who is liable. This effect can be seen, presented in graphical
form, in Figure 2.
The Original 5 Criteria
Though these 3 criteria are well established, as noted below, their
basis is found in a set of 5 criteria that were first listed in the McDonald v.
Levinson Steel Co. case. The court held that the following 5 criteria were
necessary to create statutory employer status: ( 1 ) An employer who is
under contract with an owner or one in the position of the owner; (2)
Premises occupied by or under the control of such employer; (3) A
subcontract made by such employer; (4) Part of the employer's normal
business entrusted to such subcontractor; and (5) An employee of such
subcontractor. This court found that the subcontractor relationship must be
present. As discussed below, other courts have accepted less specific
contractual relationships in its place.
The 3-Criteria Test Expanded
The following section details each of the 3 criteria. These criteria are
then carried forward to Chapter 4 where they are applied as part of the




Criterion 1 : Contractual Relationship
The contractual relationship requirement is straightforward. Although
an implied contract is sufficient under certain circumstances, the majority of
the cases show that there is usually a written document available. This is
especially true in the construction industry with the one exception being
those cases that satisfy casual employment. Casual employment will be
covered later in this chapter.
A specific employment contract or subcontract is not always required.
In Pittsburgh Steel v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, Patterson contracted
Eichealy to perform the contract. Eichealy hired the subsequently injured
employee. Patterson was held to be the statutory employer. Therefore it is
enough that the relationship exists. However, it should be noted that in the
1927 case of Gailivan v. Wark Co. 136 A. 223, 288 Pa. 443, it was recorded
that. 'This provision making contractor statutory employer of employee of
subcontractor cannot be extended further than necessary to accomplish
purpose."
Criterion 2: Occupation of the Premises
Occupation of the premises turns out to be both crucial and not quite
as simple as it first appears to be. The occupation includes being there
physically and also includes simply having the premises under control. In
the 1943 case of Davis v. Philadelphia 153 Super.Ct. 645. 35 A.2d 77, Davis
was moving machinery for an auction company that would be selling it later.
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The company was not the operator of the mine but was effectively in control
of it for the purposes of removing the machinery it wanted. In this case,
control alone was sufficient. Operation and control together were not
required.
In the case of Lee v. McMinn Industries 76 A.2d 493, 167 Pa.Super
501, 1951, the prime contractor held contracts for resurfacing of various
road surfaces and subcontracted each local area individually. One
subcontractor who held two of the individual subcontracts had an employee
injured during the transit of his roller from one site to the other. But the
court held that the prime contractor had not included the intervening
distance as part of the premises and in fact let each area out individually so
that he was not liable as a statutory employer.
The concept of premises or control is so important it overshadows
implied contract and agency. In D'Alessandro v. Barfield, 35 A.2d 412, 348
Pa. 328,1944, a boy engaged by the driver of a milk truck fell off the truck
and was injured. The boy was helping to deliver milk, without the consent,
knowledge or authorization of the dairy firm and away from the premises of
the dairy firm, where the dairy firm did not exercise control. The dairy firm
was held not to be a statutory employer.
Criterion 3: In the Normal Course of Business
Thirdly, there must work performed by the employee that is a part of
the regular business of the contractor to whom you wish to apply the label of
statutory employer. This is the area of some of the most interesting
determinations and, as will be seen in chapter 4, is one of the areas that can
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be applied to circumvent an owner's normal defenses from liability as the
employer.
The previously mentioned Davis v. City of Philadelphia states, "... who
permits ... the performance upon such premises of part of the principal
contractor's regular business entrusted to such contractor ... is liable for
compensation to such laborer in the same manner as to his own employees.'"
Qualp v. James Stewart Co. states. " This work was a part of the employers
regular business, made so by his contract with the owner." Both cases show
that it is necessary for the injured employee to be engaged in the principals
normal business if the principal is to be named as statutory employer.
Being engaged in other than the normal business of the proposed
statutory employer is sufficient cause to deny that relationship, even when
on the premises. This is shown by the case of Allen v. Babcock & Wilcox
Tube Co. 52 A.2d 314, 356 Pa. 414, 1947. The employee who was hired by
the contractor, who was hired by the Babcock and Wilcox Co., a manufacturer
of steel, was injured during excavation work required of the contractor.
Babcock and Wilcox was held not liable as a statutory employer because the
excavation work was not part of the normal course of business of making
steel.
This same principle is seen in McGrath v. Pennsylvania Sugar Co. 282
Pa. 265. 127 A. 780. 1920 where the court made a distinction between
loading operations and processing operations. It is also shown by Stipanovich
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 210 Super .Ct. 98. 231 A.2d 894. 1967 in which
the court ruled that it was optional, not obligatory, for Westinghouse to have




Avoidance of Statutory Employer Responsibility
The statutory employer responsibility of the prime contractor can be
avoided, with respect to subcontractors. Qualp v. James Stewart Co. stated.
"
This responsibility may be avoided, but it must be done in the way pointed
out by the act. and of this the employee must have notice. No unfair dealing
can thus arise."
The act identifies the same provision and means that are offered for
direct employer-employee relationships regarding rejection of the act
(covered above). The same limitations and penalties also apply. However, in
common practice, it is frequently a part of a subcontractor's contract that the
subcontractor must assume the employer role for workmen's compensation
purposes. If the subcontractor complies there is no problem. If the
subcontractor fails, then statutory employer status would be invoked and
third party lawsuits would be likely, also.
Incidental Employment
Incidental employment is another limitation to the employers liability
under the Act. It's importance in determining the result of a liability
question can be easily seen in Figure 2.
Two criteria determine that an incidental employment was not
covered by the Act. The first is that it be casual in nature. The second
criterion is that the employment occur outside the regular course of the
employer's business. This is established in Yahnert v. Logan Coal Co.. 129
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Pa.Super 528, 195 A. 450, 1938. and Smith v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal &
Iron Co. 86 Super.Ct. 136. 1925.
Casual Employment
Employment is defined as casual when it is occasional, irregular,
incidental, came about by chance or is not for a fixed duration of time. These
principles are upheld in the following three cases: Ronan v. Cornelia E. Eddy
Estate, 136 Pa.Super 436, 7 A.2d 534, 1939, Cochran v. William Penn Hotel,
140 Pa.Super 323, 13 A.2d 875, 1940, and Dobrich v. Pittsburgh Terminal
Coal Corporation, 145 Pa.Super 87, 20 A.2d 898 1941.
However, employment as a carpenter doing odd carpentry jobs on
several stores was ruled as "not casual" in Thomas v. Bache 351 Pa. 220, 40
A.2d 495, 1945. Concurrently, doing all of a given class of work offered by
an employer, even though those services are intermittent was ruled as "not
casual" in Miller v. Farmers National Bank. 152 Pa.Super 405, 33 A.2d 646,
1943.
Outside the Regular Course of Business
Along with being casual, the work must also be outside the regular
course of business for the exclusion to apply. As defined in Vescio v.
Pennsylvania Electric Co., 336 Pa. 502, 9 A.2d 546. 1939, the regular course
of business refers to, " ...the experience and custom in conduct of business as
is of usual, if not daily, occurrence and observation." This is similar to the
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term "normal course of business" used in determinations of statutory
employer responsibility.
In Snavely v. Redemptorist Fathers, 151 Pa.Super 625, 30 A.2d 724,
1943. the court stated that in the, " phrase "not in the regular course of
business of the employer", the word "regular" modified "course" and not
"business", and the question was whether an employment was in the regular
course of the employers business and not whether the employment was in
the course of the employers regular business." This differentiation only
appears in this case. For statutory employer considerations the terms
"normal course" and "normal business" appear to be interchangable.
However, the inference may be drawn that this could change if tested.
It can be seen that this criterion is treated subjectively by the courts.
The "regular course of business" is open to interpretation in most cases.
However, the concept is important because it relates to the exclusion of an
employer's liability in these cases.
Volunteer Workers
Along with incidental employment status, there is the parallel
category of "volunteer" workers. As with incidental employment, the
employer, or the one who would be the employer, if it wasn't "volunteer
work", is not liable for workmen's compensation. This was stated as early as
1919 in Fekete v. Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co., 71 Pa.Super 231 as
follows, " A mere volunteer engaging in work not expected of him and not
justified by any emergency is not an employee within this act." This
principle was also later confirmed in Holbrook v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 309
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Pa. 586, 164 A. 719, 1933, which stated, " Mere doing of work without
authority of person for whom it is done is not sufficient to entitle injured
person to compensation." However, as noted in Chapter 3, wherever the
Workmen's Compensation Act does not apply, tort options will always
remain.
Injuries to Employed Minors
Minors are a potential special category. However, in the case of the
Workmen's Compensation Act they are covered the same as any other
worker. This allows the minor to recover for injuries sustained, assuming
that the same proper conditions apply for employee status as for those of an
adult worker. It also allows the employer to avoid a tort action for trespass
brought by the parents of the minor, since exclusiveness of remedy applies.
This was tested in both Santucci v. Frank 356 Pa. 54, 51 A.2d 696, 1947 and
Zeitz v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Co., 165 Super.Ct. 295,
67 A.2d742. 1949.
One particular side note that causes a significant impact in the
employer's liability should also be mentioned . This special case issue
applies only to the case of a minor, fatally injured, in a situation where the
parents were unaware of the employment (see Figure 2). It is applicable
only to the employer. In this instance the parents may elect to give notice of
their intention to reject the Act. as if they had been aware of the
employment, and then proceed with a tort action against the employer.





The employers liability is strictly defined by the Workmen's
Compensation Act The employer is required to accept the liability defined
by the Act. However, the employer is protected from all additional liability,
including common law tort actions, by the doctrine of exclusiveness of
remedy. Furthermore, the Act caps the weekly amount payable to the
injured employee and this amount is less than paying an employee for 40
hours work at the minimum wage.
If subcontractors are involved, a three criteria test may be applied to
identify someone other than the injured worker's immediate employer as
the "employer" for workmen's compensation purposes. If this occurs, the
term "statutory employer"' is used to designate the party that becomes
responsible for compensation. This is usually, but not always, the prime
contractor.
Employer status and statutory status are both open to limited
redefinition in the contract documents. The Workmen's Compensation Act
provisions can even be rejected, if the parties agree, by following notice
provisions set forth in the Act. However, the common law tort liability is
considerably greater than the liability imposed by the Act and these options
are not usually pursued. If both parties fail to act. the Act is automatically
in force.
Lastly, the Act does not cover incidental employment. However, the
Act does cover employment of a minor, just as if the minor had been an
adult, except in the case where the the parents were unaware of the
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employment and the minor was killed. In that special circumstance the
parents may elect either the provisions of the Act or the privilege of




LIABILITY OF THE OWNER AS A THIRD PARTY
Introduction
In the determination of construction contract injury liability the
owner is usually assumed to occupy a "third-party" position. This is the
position of neither employer nor employee. This chapter examines the
liability of this position. Variations where the third party assumption is not
always valid are addressed in Chapters 2 and 4.
Third parties can include suppliers, manufacturers, co-workers and
contractees, which includes owners. For the purposes of this chapter the
owners occupation of third party status as the contractee of a construction
project is all that will be examined. Other types of third party actions are
beyond the scope of this thesis.
Third Party Status
Third parties can be sued in tort actions. This is upheld in common
law. This does not need to be proven here. However, because of it's clarity,
a Pennsylvania test case, Howard v. Berg, 86 D.& C. 358, 1954. is worthy of
note. It confirms the application in Pennsylvania by stating. " The
Workmen's Compensation Act does not affect the existing common law right
to sue the wrongdoer, unless that wrongdoer is the master." The rules of
application, of that principle, in the cases where insurer's or employers
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rights under the workmen's compensation statutes have come into play, are
not so well known.
Third party liability is not capped like the workmen's compensation
awards discussed in Chapter 2. It may include "pain and suffering" and
"punitive damages," both of which can raise the level of financial loss to
many times the actual costs of the injury and its treatment. The high cost of
these awards makes tort liability potentially more damaging than paying
workmen's compensation. The balancing factor is that all tort actions (except
those settled out of court, by the parties themselves) must submit to
examination of their merits by trial in a courtroom. There is no automatic
determination of award structure as in the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Unlike the topics of Chapters 2 and 4. the testing of third party
liability rules is not as well documented in "Pennsylvania specific" cases.
Accordingly, the author has drawn from cases throughout the country that
illustrate the principles in this chapter. Where the author found
Pennsylvania cases that have tested the principle, they are referenced in
preference to the others.
The Owner's Opponents in Tort Actions
The owner's vulnerability to legal action following a construction
injury, is inextricably related to the identities of the possible litigants who
may oppose him. Each litigant brings a slightly different scenario to the case
and the owner's possible responses vary accordingly.




(1) The injured employee, or his estate.
(2) The employer (this assumes that "employer status" is not
in question).
(3) The employer's insurance company.
These three opponents and a flow chart of their rights of action
against a third party owner are shown in Figure 3. Note that subrogation
(which can be thought of as the right of a party, to the award pursued by
another party) and indemnification, shown in Figure 3, are covered later in
this chapter.
Figure 4 shows the application of these same principles, in a more
detailed fashion, specifically tailored to usage in Pennsylvania. Both Figures
3 and 4 may be referred to throughout the remainder of this chapter.
The Employee
The injured employee's ability to recover against the owner is based
on two points. First, there must be negligence on the part of the owner and
second, there must be additional reasons sufficient for recovery (including
punitive damages and pain and suffering) not yet covered by workmen's
compensation. This is encouraged in Pennsylvania by the language of the
compensation schedules. It practically guarantees that if some provable
negligence is present there will be a cause of action for the employee (see
the "employee" line in Figure 3).
The "excess amounts" criteria is the author's interpretation of the case
















































Figure 3. General Third Party Liability Model
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Figure 4. Pennsylvania Third Party Liability Flowchart
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subrogation cases (covered later in this chapter) and the lack of any
Pennsylvania case law that indicates a contrary interpretation, in the cases
reviewed. However, it must be noted that this is not the universal opinion.
In Murphy v. Holman 176 S.E. 5. 1934. a Georgia court found that. "... a
petition alleging that the plaintiff's employee was killed by reason of the
defendants negligence ... was held to state a cause of action."
The Pennsylvania Employee
The negligence requirement, in Pennsylvania case law. as well as
additional confirmation of the right to tort action by an employee, is found in
the recent case of Whirley Industries, Inc. v. Segel. 462 A.2d 800. 316
Pa.Super 75. 1983. The court states. " ...where an employee's injuries are the
result of negligence by a third party, the employee may bring an action
against the third party." Note that, as shown in Figure 4. this is voluntary. If
the employee does not proceed a third party owner will end up paying
nothing.
The Least Limiting Criterion
While the above discussion clearly relates the current stance of recent
case law, there is historical precedent for a far less limiting criterion being
applied to the question of the employee's right to sue. This less limiting
criterion can be thought of as the principle of "If the compensation doesn't
cover it. then you can sue." This is shown in Boal v. Electric Storage Battery
Co., 98 F.2d 815, 1938, which states, " An employee's remedy under the
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Workmen's Compensation Act of Pennsylvania is exclusive, but where not
entitled to recover thereunder the employee may sue in tort."
This principle is a simple statement of sufficient conditions for
initiation of a tort action. Although not exactly in line with criteria
established in more recent decisions, nothing in those decisions has
specifically ruled out the applicability of this approach. It appears it could
be used.
Lack of Limits on Amounts
Of special importance is the amount that may be recovered. In
Pennsylvania, negligence is not necessarily in equitable proportion to the
amount sought in tort. Thus in Jones v. Carborundum Co.. 5 15 F.Supp 559.
1981. we find, " Under Pennsylvania law. if employer's negligence amounted
to 90% and third party's negligence was only 10%, injured employee would
nevertheless be entitled to collect his full damages from the third-party tort-
feasor." This principle is noted in both Figures 3 and 4, by "any amount of
owner negligence" and "owner found to be negligent in any amount"
respectively.
As a modification to the above it should be noted that the option to
settle out of court does exist for employee verses third party lawsuits. Case
law verification of the application of that privilege to construction accidents
can be found in cases such as Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Eaby. 1 1
1
Pa.Super 589, 170 A. 532, 1934, where an insurance company went after a





The employer may also have a claim against the third party. The
process of resolution varies from state to state.
In Maryland, in Storrs v. Mech, 170 A. 743, 1934, a self insuring
employer, who had paid compensation, " was entitled to be reimbursed by
maintaining an action against the tort-feasor causing the employee's death,
the court rejecting the contention that the employer could not recover."
Also, in New York, "an employer who had paid compensation ... was held
entitled to bring an action for reimbursement from the third person whose
negligence caused the employee's death," Coleman v. Cating Rope Works, 286
N.Y.S. 315. 1936. The viability of this combination varies from state to state.
In Figure 3, the author charts the process first with subrogation and then
with a check of direct action. This is because the author found no evidence
that direct action ever has precedence over subrogation whenever a
subrogation right exists.
In an appeal of Storrs v. Mech above, Mech v. Storrs, 179 A. 525,
1935. it was held that the employer, "was not limited by the amount of the
award of compensation ... but might recover the full amount to which the
deceaseds dependant was entitled...". But in Washington, in State v. Starr,
52 P.2d 897, 1935. this is reversed and we find, "could not recover more
than the amount of the compensation award,". Finally in Georgia, in Western
U. Teleg. Co. v. Smith, 178 S.E. 472, 1935. the court determined that, " an
employer who had paid compensation for injuries resulting from the
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negligence of a third person should be subrogated to the right of the
employee...".
Pennsylvania Specific Cases
The Pennsylvania pattern is similar to the Georgia case. The employer
can recover his costs of compensation paid, but only through subrogation and
not as a result of direct action against the third party (note the difference
between Figure 4 and Figure 3).
These principles are supported by several cases. The basic right to
recovery is found in Myers v. Commercial Union Assur. Companies, 319
Pa.Super 21, 465 A.2d 1032, 1982, and Wiest v. Eazor Exp., Inc., 311
Pa.Super 128. 457 A.2d 527, 1982. which both contain the statement. " If an
employer's liability is occasioned by fault of a third party, employer may
pursue its subrogation rights under Workmen's Compensation Act."
Whirley Industries. Inc. v. Segel. previously cited in the section on
employee rights, also contains the employer's subrogation right but includes
the stipulation that it exists. " ...so long as it can show that it was compelled
to make payments to the employee by reason of the negligence of the third
party." This appears to be unnecessary common sense but actually refers to
situations where payments were never made or settlements occurred out of
court and then the stipulation would limit the employers recovery.
In similar vein, is the statement, " ...if the employer is 100% negligent,
he loses the benefit of his right to subrogation." quoted from Jones v.
Carborundum. 515 F.Supp 559. 1981. regarding third party suits initiated in
the name of the employee and subsequent employer rights to
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reimbursement. Note that from the owner's perspective, the payment in a
judgement rendered against him would not be affected unless, of course, the
owner was not negligent, in which case he could avoid the compensation
award amount as well as other damages.
The employer's lack of cause of action to pursue separate tort against
the third party is found in Erie Castings Co. v. Grinding Supply, Inc. 736 F.2d
99, 1984, which states, " Employer has no common law right of action for
indemnity or contribution against alleged third-party tort-feasor; worker's
compensation statutes provide exclusive remedy, and employer must
proceed in action brought on behalf of the injured employee." Therefore, in
Pennsylvania, the owner can expect one action, in the name of the employee,
with the employer's interest joined in that action if he thinks the owner may
have been negligent and he can recover his compensation claim.
In Figure 3 the above point is shown with a separate block. Note in
Figure 4, however, that this is assumed since there is no other possibility in
Pennsylvania.
Comparative Negligence
An extremely important point is the concept of comparative
negligence. This concept states that the payment would be apportioned to
the parties as a function of their relative negligence in the cause of the
accident. It is important because that concept does not apply in
Pennsylvania. In the previously mentioned Jones v. Carborundum Co. case it
states, " ...employer is entitled to recoup in full the entire amount of
compensation available, even if the third party's negligence is less than the
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employer's negligence." This is similar to the employees rights noted above
and serves together with them to make the owner potentially liable for all
the costs and damages of the injury if he is even just slightly negligent with
regard to that injury.
Points in the Owners Favor
Despite the foregoing discussion, case law is not completely against the
third party owner. Two minor points in the owners favor are also
represented in the existing case law.
First, the third party is not liable for any increase in the employers
insurance rates following the injury, even if it is determined that the third
party caused the injury. Stated in Erie Castings v. Grinding Supply Co., "Third
Party causing injury to employee is not liable under Pennsylvania law to
employer for increase in insurance premiums attributable to employee's
worker's compensation claim." Secondly, as confirmed in Conrad v. Aero-
Mayflower Transit Co., 152 Pa.Super 477, 33 A.2d 91, 1943, "there is no
provision for the expenses of an attorney or trial costs...".
The Insurer
The rights of the insurer are more limited than those of the employer.
Separate action is often denied and recovery or reimbursement is frequently
limited to subrogation. However, from the owner standpoint this still means
that an unsuccessful defense will leave the owner paying the full amount of




Verifying the right to reimbursement of the insurer in other states
are: (1) Staples v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp.. 62 F.2d 650, 1932 (in
Oklahoma), (2) Scheno Trucking Co. v. Bickford, 174 A. 548, 1934 (in New
Jersey). (3) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mueller, 278 N.Y.S. 140. 1935 (in New
York) and (4) Travelers Ins. Co. v. Georgia Power Co.. 181 S.E. Ill, and
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bumstead. 186 S.E. 742, 1936, both from Georgia.
In both of the two Georgia cases. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Georgia Power
Co. and Travelor's Ins. Co. v. Bumstead. as well as the New York case. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mueller, the courts stated that there was no right available
to the insurance companies that would allow them to proceed, seeking
reimbursement, with independent actions of their own against the third
party. This is shown graphically in Figure 3.
However, differences between the states exist. In Massachusetts, the
case of Bresnahan v. Barre. 190 N.E. 815, 1934, concerned a third party and
the rights of an insurer who has already paid compensation. The court
stated that the insurer, "might enforce the liability of such person." Even
more specifically, prosecution of an action (separate) is allowed as a question
for resolution of the court in Murray v. Rossmeisal, 187 N.E. 622. 1933.
Note in Figure 3. no independent course of action block is shown. Even
in the Massachusetts case it is not clear that this exists. The exact vehicle to
be used for enforcement is not specified, while in Murray v. Rossmeisal the




In Pennsylvania, the insurer, like the employer has no right of action
by itself but does have a statutory right to reimbursement under
subrogation. The court stated in Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wis. v.
Melcher, 378 Pa. 598, 107 A.2d 874, 1954, "Where ... insurer was required to
pay compensation .... insurer was entitled to be subrogated to ... right of
payment". Whoever pays the claim, either the employer or the insurer is
entitled to reimbursement based on subrogation.
Finally, in the previously mentioned Moltz v. Sherwood Bros., the
insurance company that paid the compensation tried to recover
reimbursement, based on subrogation, after the employee recovered a
judgement against a liable third party. The court ruled against the insurer
stating that they were too late in trying to join the action and that having
failed to look after their interests properly, they were out of options because
they had no right to pursue a separate action of their own.
Subrogation
As noted above, subrogation is the vehicle of reimbursement for
insurers in Oklahoma, New Jersey, New York and Georgia. It can end up
being more than the simple amount required for reimbursement. In
California, an employer recovered the entire amount of a judgement
awarded the employee, including excess above the amount paid as




In Texas, subrogation also works for the insurer, even when the
insurer declined the option to pursue the cause of action against the third
party. The insurer's subrogation privilege allows recovery of paid
compensation from the proceedings of the award to the estate of the
deceased employee in the suit which the insurer previously declined to




In Pennsylvania, the employer or the insurance carrier can receive
reimbursement, for compensation paid, through the vehicle of subrogation, if
they join an action brought by the employee or his estate against the third
party. Stated in Moltz v. Sherwood Bros. 116 Pa.Super 231, 176 A. 842,
1935, " ...an employer's right of subrogation against a third party alleged to
be liable for an employee's injury must be worked out through an action
brought in the name of the injured employee.... '.
Stating the Pennsylvania perspective on subrogation most clearly and
at the same time covering both employer and insurer rights to it, is the very
recent case of Reliance Ins. Co. v. Richmond Machine Co.. 309 Pa.Super 430.
455 A.2d 686. 1983. This case states that, " for employer or it's insurer to
enforce its subrogation rights against alleged third party tort-feasors
responsible for injuries to employee, it must proceed in action brought on
behalf of employee in order to determine liability of third party to employee
and if such liability is determined, then employer's insurer may recover, out
of an award to injured employee the amount that has been paid in worker's
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compensation benefits." Note that this case also states the need to join an
action already launched in the name of the injured employee (see Figure 3).
One possible complication of the subrogation process is the potential
for double payouts being required of the third party as a result of the
several claimants to that money. In Pennsylvania this is covered by the
necessity of the employer and insurer joining the employees action and
their inability to initiate actions of their own against the third party.
Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 502 Pa. 101, 465 A.2d 609, 1983.
states. " Negligent third party is liable to injured employee for full amount of
any judgement, and there is no possibility that injured employee will
recover amount in excess of his damages, since where compensable injury is
caused by act of third party, employer who has paid worker's compensation
benefits is subrogated to right of employee against such third party."
Therefore, the bottom line is that if the employee proceeds with an
action against the third party and the third party is the least bit negligent, it
can expect to pay the entire amount, compensation included, once the
employer or insurer (whoever initially paid the compensation) joins the
action in pursuit of reimbursement (see Figure 4).
However, if the employee takes his compensation money without
initiating an action then, in Pennsylvania at least, the third party is not
vulnerable. Neither the employer or insurer can pursue their own actions
against him. But since the Pennsylvania employee is not subject to election
(see below), the only negative inducements acting on his decision to proceed
with tort action are the attorney fees and the time it takes. This leaves the
third party owner rather vulnerable but there is one more crucial ingredient

60
in the equation, indemnification, covered at the end of this chapter, which
can help reduce the owners risk.
Elgfitioa
Election is a term that sometimes appears in reference to third party
suits connected with workmen's compensation issues. A brief discussion of
this concept is included here for clarity.
Election appears in the cases from both Washington (State v. Starr)
and Oklahoma (Staples v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp.) previously cited in this
chapter. It was further found, by the author, in the Oklahoma case of Keener
Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushong. 56 R2d 819. 1936.
In both of these states, election is a statutory provision that forces the
injured employee party to decide to either accept compensation or waive
compensation and pursue a common law action against an allegedly
negligent third party.
This procedure does exist in the two states mentioned above and may
exist in others. However, no mention of election was observed in any of the
cases from other states referenced in this work and it is specifically not in
force in Pennsylvania. It is not treated further in this thesis.
Negligence
In the preceding discussions, it can be seen that negligence is a
required element of common law liability. It was also shown that
Pennsylvania law allows the interpretation of any negligence, no matter how
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small, on the part of a third party, to be sufficient for judgement against that
third party for the entire amount of the damages.
The owner will usually be cast in the role of a third party (for
exceptions see chapter 4) and his liability will therefore hinge on
determinations of negligence. As stated in McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co.,
302 Pa. 287, 153 A. 424, 1930, " the owner of the premises may be subject
to a common-law action for any negligence on his part which was the
proximate cause of the workman's injuries." This makes the definition of
negligence vitally important to the owner.
Defining Negligence
Unfortunately, there is no definition of negligence that is as clean and
workable as most of the other points considered in this thesis. Negligence
has a common law foundation, not a statutory one. Negligence is often given
over to the jury to be decided as part of their deliberations. It does not
function as a simple point of law. Resolving questions of negligence is
characterized in the often cited, Conway v. O'Brien, 1 1 F.2d 611, 1940, " For
this reason a solution always involves some preference, or choice between
incommensurables, and it is consigned to a jury because their decision is
thought most likely to accord with commonly accepted standards, real or
fancied."
Negligence relies upon an interpretation of "what the reasonable man
should have done". This is highly subjective and can include further
subjective interpretations of what was foreseeable and what was a
reasonable assumption of risk. Again from Conway v. O'Brien, " The degree
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of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors:
The likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness
of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which he must
sacrifice to avoid the risk. All these are practically not susceptible of any
quantitative estimate..."
It is not the purpose of this work to try and define negligence in the
same detail the author has applied elsewhere. No such definition is possible,
given the current state of case law. However, some authors of legal works
have given the negligence issue a limited structure and a condensation of a
few of their ideas, along with a selection of examples, is included here
because of the importance of this issue.
The Three Categories of Negligence
Negligence can occur in a host of areas. This paper will define
negligence as falling into one of three categories. The categories are ( 1
)
active or primary. (2) passive or vicarious and (3) ratification. These
categories were originally suggested by Branch (1988, p. 20) but can be
found in similar form in Simon (1989. pp. 45-57) and Sweet (1985. pp. 100-
124. 817-834). Both Sweet and Simon break active negligence down into
several other categories of their own. All three treatments differ from each





Category 1 : Active Negligence
The active negligence category appears to have the greatest breadth.
It is composed of negligence in selecting a contractor, negligence in providing
proper sites and materials and negligence in either exercising or retaining
control over the conduct of the work.
Negligence in selection of a contractor is probably the least likely to be
a problem. It should be noted, though, that incompetence in a contractor can
leave an owner liable for injuries to the workmen, if the owner was aware of
the contractors negligence. Peck v. Womack. 192 P.2d 874. 1948.
Negligence in providing either the site or materials or tools can
become a trap for the owner. As soon as the owner provides anything he
has assumed some liability for its function, and consequently for related
injuries. The case which seems to be the foundation for this principle
occurred before the turn of the century and involved a worker injured by an
owner provided crane. Johnson v. Spear. 42 N.W. 1092. 1898. A recent
(1984) example in Tennessee held the owner liable for injuries to a
contractors employee from a fall off an owner supplied ladder that didn't
meet OSHA standards. Teal v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.. 728 F.2d 799.
1984.
Negligence in control is perhaps the most visible concern. The use of
contract inspectors and administrators begs the question of how much
attention becomes control. The answer is still the same, negligence goes to
the jury. However, several cases were found that review owner control in
other states and while there are some exceptions (like Emberton v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.. 358 N.E.2d 1254. 1976. where the
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owner was liable for control because of input to the drafting of plans and
subsequent inspection efforts) most of the cases did not go against the
owner. Some examples of cases where owner negligence due to control was
tried and failed are: Jones v. City of Logansport, 436 N.E.2d 1 138, 1982
(Indiana), Williams v. Gervais F. Favrot Co., 499 So.2d 623. 1987 (Louisiana),
which stated that, " owner s periodic inspection did not create an exercise of
control by the owner...", and Van Ness v. Independent Construction Co. 392
So.2d 1017, 1981 (Florida).
Category 2: Vicarious Negligence
The passive or vicarious negligence category is one that is applied
without regard to fault. While it can include some other types of problems,
such as illegal work and public nuisance, it is generally a factor in
construction with regard to "ultrahazardous" or "inherently dangerous" work.
There are cases on record, including Williams v. Gervais F. Favrot. cited
above, that define construction work, per se, as not ultrahazardous or
inherently dangerous. However, there are other cases, involving
construction that captured one label or the other due to the nature of the
specific tasks being performed. There is no positive answer at the present
time. Branch (1988, p. 39) states, "Whether the work being done is, in fact,
inherently dangerous is a fact question for the jury." That continues to
affirm the previously stated conclusion that the negligence question will be
decided by a jury rather than by the precedent that exists to date.
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Category 3: Negligence by Ratification
Finally, ratification is a form of negligence which the owner should
treat with a good deal of respect. Recognizing that control of the job is
unwise the owner may still attempt to have some kind of approval authority.
In Herman v. City of Buffalo, 108 N.E. 452. 1915, an engineer of the city (the
owner) approved the laying of a foundation that subsequently was revealed
as the cause of the buildings collapse during construction. The court held
against the city (in 1913) that the city (as owner) was liable. The appeals
case cited above overturned the decision, on technical grounds relating to
instructions to the jury, not on the correctness of the owner's liability due to
negligence. Again, the owner can be liable and the question of negligence
will be decided by the jury.
Tort Reform
Sweet (1985, pp. 831-833) suggests that tort liability has grown
beyond it's proper place in the legal system. He expresses the feeling that it
has eclipsed workmen's compensation and suggests some possible reforms,
even pointing out attempts made by several states. Tort reform of this type
has not occurred in Pennsylvania. Opinion remains divided on the
advisability of limiting tort availability to victims and the owner should not




The owner desiring to limit his exposure to liability for negligence
should examine his own operation in light of the categories mentioned here
and may wish to consider the "Owners Five Point Guide to Basic Negligence",
detailed on Figure 5. which includes a short format for ease of memory. The
reader should recognize that the author is not a lawyer and this guide is the
result of an academic exercise only. It is not sufficient to base a court
defense on, although it may provide a starting place or help in
conceptualization.
OSHA as a Private Cause of Action
One of the persistent questions raised during the course of this
research effort was the apparent uncertainty of whether allowing OSHA
violations on a site put the owner in jeopardy of an increased liability. This
was especially interesting during the site investigation phase of the project
where OSHA regulations were used as the standard for the determination of
the subjective safety of the four construction sites during daily operations.
It turned out that this has been tested several times, although not in
Pennsylvania, and the current case law has strongly concluded that OSHA
violations do not increase an owner's liability and can not be used as a cause
of action in a tort proceeding.
The cases that have tested this include a paralyzing fall from improper
scaffolding. Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co. 507 F.2d 973. 1975, and two instances
of crushing, one injurious and one fatal, due to improper trench shoring,

67















Figure 5. Owners Five-Point Guide to Basic Negligence
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Russel v. Bartly, 494 F.2d 334. 1974. and Hare v. Federal Compress &
Warehouse Co. 359 F.Supp 214. 1973.
In all these cases the idea that the OSHA violations might create a
cause of action against the owner, or a duty on the owners part, was
specifically tested and rejected by the court. There were no instances of case
law discovered by the author that countered or mitigated this principle even
in the slightest part.
Indemnity
The right of indemnity in the event of a third party action by the
injured party against the owner is one of the more interesting legal
machinations that can occur.
The owner does not necessarily have to absorb the entire penalty that
may be imposed by an unfavorable decision in a third party action. This
occurs when the owner can successfully join the contractor as employer to
the third party suit as an additional defendant.
This would appear to be a contradiction of the workmen's
compensation principle but under common law it has been upheld. However,
a key element must be in place for this to occur.
There must be a duty on the part of the contractor to contribute to or
to indemnify the owner. The best way to establish this duty is to find a
clause in the contract that spells this out. It is common for an indemnity
clause to be written in the contract. In fact, all the contracts that this author
has had contact with, in his administration of federal contracts duties, have

69
had some form of indemnity clause that attempted to satisfy this key
element.
Indemnity Clauses
There has not been a single right way established to write an
indemnity clause. Most indemnity clauses attempt to have the contractor
"hold the owner blameless" and assume "all liability" so that the owner is
safe from tort action. The idea is that an unfavorable verdict against the
owner, as third party, will be paid for by the contractor, under the
indemnification clause. The advantages, to the owner, in the event of a
subrogation claim for compensation reimbursement are obvious.
Historically, the clauses have functioned mostly as a way to avoid the
payment of the compensation (as from a subrogated tort action) and not as a
general cure-all type of shield, against all liability (however, see the
following section).
One example of the way these clauses are worded is found in the A I
A
document A201. General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, Article
4.18 (Sweet 1985. p. 925). This particular format indicates that " the
Contractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the Owner ... from and against
all claims, damages, losses and expenses. ... regardless of whether or not it is
caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder." That last part means
"even if its the owners fault".
This kind of clause appears unfair but it is the only real protection
against the owner absorbing liability for compensation payments through
subrogated employers or insurers claims. A sort of backhanded proof of it's
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validity is available, in Pennsylvania case law, in the case of Ledford v.
Central Medical Pavilion Inc. 90 F.R.D. 445. The court states, "...employer
shall not be liable to third party for damages, contribution or indemnity in
any action at law or otherwise except by contract."
This is admittedly, not conclusive, but it does suggest that by contract,
the employer could be held to indemnify the owner. While the author did
not find any additional test cases that served to further clarify this, it should
be recognized that the indemnity clause is included, in current contracts, for
exactly this purpose.
Extended Indemnity
The foregoing discussion on indemnity may be undergoing some
change. While not yet tested in Pennsylvania, several recent decisions point
to an expanded liability on the part of the employer.
As previously noted, the majority of the decisions indicated that if the
contractor signs a contract agreeing to "indemnify and hold the owner
harmless," this carried over into an assumption of third party liability that
may be found against the owner. However, the employers liability was still
limited to the maximums listed in the workmen's compensation statutes.
In O'Neill v. United States 276 F. Supp 724, 1967. and later Fisher v.
United States 299 F. Supp 1. 1969. this principle underwent some change.
Both cases validated the new concept that the Workmen's Compensation Act
was only effective for the employer-employee relationship and therefore did
not limit liability for third party negligence of the owner transferred to the
contractor by a valid indemnity clause.
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This makes the indemnity clause an increasingly powerful tool for the
owner. Most contractors are still not fully aware of the broad interpretation
of the clause. It may look like a clause that says the contractor will not sue
the owner and it's role in divesting the owner of financial loss, in the event
of his own negligence, while transferring responsibility for payment to the
contractor, is likely to be an unpleasant surprise. From the perspective of
the owner, however, it should be understood that the indemnity clause is
protection against the particularly undesireable effects of the far-reaching
subrogation principle.
Summary
This chapter focused on the liability of the owner in a "third party"
role. The third party status allows the owner to be sued in a common law
tort action. The owner's opponents may be the injured employee, the
employee's estate, the employer or the insurance company. In all these
cases, the owner does not enjoy any protection that may limit the dollar
value of the liability.
If the owner is negligent, even just partially. Pennsylvania law allows
the party that paid compensation to attempt to recover that amount through
subrogation. This is in addition to the amount the owner may have to pay to
the employee in excess of compensation levels.
The owner's best defense is to avoid actions that will create the




The owner's other defense is to incorporate a properly written
indemnity clause into the contract. The indemnity clause will force the
contractor to assume the financial liability for compensation amounts in the
event of subrogation. Additionally, extended liability, that transfers the
complete financial burden, has been successfully defended in federal courts.
However, extended liability has not been tested in Pennsylvania.
Finally. OSHA violations do not form a private cause of action and do




DEFINING THE OWNER AS EITHER THE EMPLOYER
OR AS A THIRD PARTY
Introduction
In this chapter the distinction between third party and employer
status for the owner will be investigated. If the owner is clearly one or the
other in all cases then the problem is simplified. The owner can plan
financially for the eventuality of an injury on the jobsite with full knowledge
of the expected liability. Additionally, the owner can prepare to meet the
proper safety responsibilities. It is shown that while a definitive trend does
exist in Pennsylvania this is not so clear nationwide.
However, even in Pennsylvania where the wording of the statutes has
been interpreted rather uniformly, the owners actions can still reverse the
normal result. The actions that cause reversal are also discussed since an
owner attempting to avoid unwarranted liability must remain aware of these
possibilities. It is also shown, by extension, that a less scrupulous owner
could conceivably reduce or eliminate the liability that rightfully should be
accepted..
Owner-Emplover Definitions Nationwide
The question of when the owner is the employer and when the owner
is in a third party status is not clear when cases are taken indiscriminately
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from across the United States. Each state has passed it's own set of
workmen's compensation or similar statutes and these statutes are not
uniform in either language or application.
The duty owed by the landowner to a "business invitee" is usually
defined as the owner's responsibility (as seen in Chapter 3) but this duty can
also be given to the prime contractor, as in Delgado v. W. C. Garcia & Assoc.
27 Cal. Rptr 613. 1963. thus reducing the owner's liability and defining the
contractor as the employer. If a provision for this effect is not in a given
state's statutes, then the owner, by virtue of land ownership, may be the
"employer" because of the responsibility to provide for the safe workplace.
However, this duty is not conclusive of employer status and may be a duty
owed as a third party, as in Gordon v. Matson, 439 S.W.2d 627, 1969, where
the subcontractor, under Arkansas statute, was liable for failing to provide
the safe workplace.
Retained control was already shown as an area where the owner could
be found liable for negligence. Neither Branch (1988) nor Sweet (1985)
specifically link negligence to the workmen's compensation statutes in any of
the states they use as examples. This could lead to an interpretation that it
is unimportant in that regard.
The Silence of the Reference Texts
In the preceding sections it was shown that the liability of the
employer as defined by Pennsylvania's Workmen's Compensation Act was
quite different than the liability attached to a third party, which is
established on relatively common principles throughout the United States.
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Every reference text reviewed makes some mention of this difference in
liability but the implication is that there is no question about the identity of
the parties. The question of "when is the owner the employer" does not
seem to be addressed. Yet it would make a potentially big difference,
financially, if such an identity determination was open to the interpretation
of the courts.
Additionally, there is an almost complete lack of information in the
reference texts relating to the question of whether the owner is ever the
employer. A review of general texts, including all general reference works
listed in the bibliography of this paper will not produce many references to
the employer vs. third party question.
The Choice of a Single State Example
This situation would lead to a justifiable but flawed interpretation that
the question is moot and not one of substance. Even then the circumstances
would vary depending upon which state was considered.
Each state could be examined. But defining which states try the issue
as a matter of substance and which ones do not is beyond the scope of this
thesis. One state. Pennsylvania, is covered. It was determined that the issue
is one of substance in Pennsylvania, the location chosen for the "laboratory
example." It has been tried in court and various rules have arisen that can
be used to predict, with some measure of success, which category is likely to
apply to the owner in the aftermath of a construction injury.
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Interpretation of Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation Statutes
One important item that must be noted is the perspective given to use
of the statutes. Briefly touched upon in Chapter 2, the rule is that the
workmen's compensation laws conflict with the general flow of common law
and therefore must be strictly construed, except for the liberal construction
required to carry out the obvious purpose of helping the injured employee.
While at first seeming somewhat contradictory, this perspective is in
fact a necessary adjunct to the principle of liberal construction mentioned in
Chapter 2. In Stevenson v. Westmoreland Coal Co. 21 A.2d 468, 146
Pa.Super 32, 1941, it was held that, " Workmen's Compensation Act is in
derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed within it's
broad purpose." This was to prevent an employee from recovering damages
for an injury received over 8 years previously when during that time he had
taken no action to obtain compensation. Previously in Zimmer v. Casey, 146
A. 130. 296 Pa. 529, 1929, the court overturned a lower court ruling refusing
to allow third party suits stating that, "As the Compensation Act is in
derogation of the common law, it must receive a strict construction but not
such as would in any way fetter it's humane purposes." This doctrine of
strict construction outside the area of protecting the injured employee is
required to prevent abuse. It has the affirmation of the state's Supreme
Court. In follow-on appeal actions, Stevenson v. Westmoreland was heard by
the Supreme Court and affirmed by citing the requirement for strict
construction even when that measure may appear to be harsh. 26 A.2d 199.
344 Pa. 561, 1942.
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Categories Evident in Pennsylvania Case Lav
Three broad categories that provide the foundation for the application
of the law are evident. They are the Master-Servant Relationship', the
Independent Contractor' and the Statutory Employer'. Each category is
covered below, as are three additional special cases that are noteworthy
subsets of the main categories. The law has developed different applications
in each category but they all remain related in principle by their association
with the Workmen's Compensation Statutes.
The Master-Servant Relationship
The master-servant relationship is crucial to the employer-employee
status determination. Although it may at first appear that this is a broad
definition of a relationship and therefore open to wide-ranging differences of
interpretation, further inspection reveals that it is much stricter than that
and open to interpretation only on rather narrow grounds.
The master-servant relationship developed from early common law
tort actions and appears to have been included in the statutes because of the
depth of precedent that exists concerning the definition. This allowed the
legislators to include in the statute the full scope of the definition, already
developed by case law, without the burden of redefining what they meant
by "employer" themselves. It follows that this relationship must be
addressed in the context of defining who is the employer.
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First, the employer must occupy the role of master and the employee
must occupy the role of servant. This is rather obvious but remains
noteworthy for two reasons. Recognition of this fact is essential to satisfy
completeness of the concept, and secondly, it is a defense to hold when one
party truthfully functioned in the prescribed role and the other party did
not. This is frequently the case with subcontractors.
The attendant question is when does a master-servant relationship
exist? Also, are there some specific instances that can be identified and
applied prior to court to assess the appropriate category for an owner? The
answers are very closely related.
The 4 -Criteria Test
As noted in Rich Hill Coal Co. v. Bashore 334 Pa. 449, 7 A.2d 302,
1939, " The relation of master and servant exists where the employer has
the right to select the employee, the power to remove and discharge him.
and the right to direct both what work shall be done and the way and
manner in which it shall be done." This is based on an earlier decision,
McColligan v. Pa. R. R. Co. 214 Pa. 229. 63 A. 792, which quotes an almost
identical passage referenced from the 20 Am Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.) (p.
11.12).
In Cookson v. Knauff. 157 Super .Ct. 401, 43 A.2d 402. 1945. citing
McColligan v. Pa R. R. Co. and affirming Rich Hill Coal Co. v. Bashore, we find,
"The master and servant relation exists where the employer has the right to
select the employee, the power to discharge him, and the right to direct both
what work shall be done and the way and manner in which it shall be done."
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Additionally, Cookson v. Knauff states that, " The vital test in determining
whether a workman is a servant of the person who engages him for the
work is whether he is subject to the latter's control or right of control not
only with regard to the work to be done but also with regard to the manner
of performance."
These decisions provide four points that must all be satisfied if a
master-servant and henceforth an employer-employee relationship is to
exist. They are the basis for all determinations that the employer-employee
relationship exists based on common law master-servant principles. Listing
these particular points as the key points of law to be considered in
establishing the master-servant relationship as it applies to the employer-
employee relationship is also confirmed in several other cases including
Simonton v. Morton, 275 Pa. 562. 1 19 A. 732. 1923, Keiley v. D. L. & W. R. R.
Co.. 270 Pa. 426. 1 13 A. 419, 1921. and Phipps v. Greensboro Gas Co.. 109
Pa.Super 382, 1933 (Phipps v. Greensboro Gas Co. by exception, proving that
without the satisfaction of these criteria an Independent Contractor' status
exists instead). Each criteria is described below.
The First Criterion of the 4-Criteria Test
The first criterion is the right to select an employee. Usually this is
clearly the purview of whoever is signing the employee's paycheck. It gets
muddied however from an owners standpoint when professional
qualifications of some or all workers can be reviewed by the owner as a
contractual "protection." Even more interesting is the situation where the
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owner specifies by contract clause a recommended list of subcontractors for
specific parts of the project.
The Second Criterion of the 4-Criteria Test
The master-servant relationship requires the criterion that the
employer be empowered to remove and discharge employees. Again this is
obviously a power held by the contractor who hired the worker. However, it
is also a power that is sometimes reserved by the owner as a "protection" in
case a specific worker becomes a problem on the site. This specific provision
exists in all the larger federal contracts that the author has worked with.
Additionally, blanket provisions allowing the owner to stop the work, such as
section 33 of the standard AIA construction contract (document A101 )
(Sweet 1985, p. 923). have been challenged as satisfying this criterion by
giving the owner the right to discharge all employees.
The Third Criterion of the 4-Criteria Test
The employer satisfies the master-servant relationship by holding the
right to direct what work shall be done. Note that direction is different than
planning or preparing plans, but is closely related to scheduling when done
at the micro level. This tends to suggest that there is an area of detailed
scheduling that could be interpreted as directing what work shall be done.
By extension it also serves to absolve the architect/engineer from
consideration as an employer as long as he is not active on the site. Note
that the employer status may accrue to the owner if his representative,
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perhaps engineer or inspector, directs (details, schedules) the order of the
work and thus satisfies this criteria, as the owners agent.
The Fourth Criterion of the 4-Criteria Test
The fourth criterion is the right to direct the "way and manner" in
which the work shall be done. This is similar to the third criterion but is
separated from it by the element of time. Time is the key consideration of
the third criteria, both as to the size of the unit considered and as to
separation of the work from the moment of decision. In the fourth criteria
time plays no role and method becomes the key element. Again it is
understood that an architect/engineer prepared set of plans and specs exists
and this criterion is addressing the application of those plans and specs to
the project at hand. The method of achieving the results indicated on the
plans must be open to variation or decision and the employer is specified as
the individual or entity exercising the right to decide upon these methods.
Importance of the Third and Fourth Criteria
In Berg v. Rosefsky 202 Super.Ct. 598. 198 A.2d 334. 1964, the court
reaffirmed that the third and fourth points were of somewhat more
importance than the first two by the process of excluding the first two
points, " The vital test in determining whether a workman is the servant of
the person engaging him is whether he is subject to such person's control or
right of control with regard to both the work done and the manner of
performing it." This principle, similar to that quoted from Cookson v. Knauff

82
earlier, also appears in Potash v. Bonaccurso 179 Pa.Super 582, 1 17 A.2d
803, 1955, and Felton v. Mellot 165 Pa.Super 229, 67 A.2d 727, 1949.
While this is a pointed test in a rather recent decision, the body of
case law indicates that all 4 criteria are important. That perspective is
adhered to in this thesis. However, by virtue of the decision giving a relative
ranking to the criteria, the foundation has been laid for a quantitative
determination by a future court in a case where neither party satisfied all
the criteria but each satisfied some of them. The judge could point to this
precedent and rule that satisfaction of certain criteria carried more weight
than satisfaction of others. The author did not find any case where this was
tested.
The Concept of "Rights"
Note in the above set of criteria that in three of the categories the
word "right" appears. From these decisions it is very evident that in those
three criteria there does not need to be any exercise of the function, per se,
but only the right to do so if the individual so chooses. This is important. It
is especially so when examining the second criteria which requires the
"power" to discharge employees and again does not say anything about
actually exercising this power. In effect, all four criteria rest on the
documentation of the "right" to perform the various functions and do not
require even a single performance of any function to be satisfied.
The best kind of evidence in a court room, that someone did have a
right or power, would be to show that it was exercised. Common sense tells
us this is true and it is convenient to presume that this would most likely be
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the case. However it is not required, and an interesting corollary therefore
surfaces. It is not a defense to merely show that one or more, or even all
these criteria, went unexercised. Employer status may still apply if the 4
criteria simply existed as someone's right to exercise if they wanted to.
This has been tested in rather dramatic fashion in the case of Fanning
v. Apawana Golf Club, 169 Super .Ct. 180, 82 A.2d 584, 1951. In this case a
caddy, who received payment from the individual golfers, but was
permitted, along with about a dozen other caddys, to operate routinely at the
club, lost an eye to a golf ball. The club did not want to be held liable as the
employer. The court (paraphrasing and editing from Feller v. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co., 363 Pa. 483, 70 A.2d 299) ruled that ," With regard
to the power to direct the way and manner of doing the work, the question is
not whether the employer actually exercised control, but whether he had the
right to control." (emphasis added). Gearly this court identified the "right"
as the key element. Other Pennsylvania cases affirming Fanning v. Apawana
Golf Club include McManus v. Kuhn 194 Pa.Super 544, 168 A.2d 618, 1961
and Stewart v. URYC 237 Pa.Super 258. 352 A.2d 465. 1975.
Summary of the 4-Criteria Test
While never specifically enumerated, the 4 functions appear to
require satisfaction in all 4 parts to designate an individual as the employer
by virtue of this master-servant relationship. Thus while two parties may
find that they exercised control over one or more of the functions, currently
it is not until all 4 criteria have been found to reside by right or power in
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one individual or entity that the employer determination is satisfied
(however, see also Berg v. Rosefsky, discussed previously).
This leaves us with the master-servant relationship as defined by 4






3. Timing of the work
4. Methodology of the work
This 4 phrase group captures the essence of the 4 criteria concept and
keeps it simple. It is further detailed in Figure 6, which also shows the flow
to the third party status determination. All 4 criteria must be satisfied.
Once they are satisfied, then the employer is identified. No exercise of any
or all of these functions is required for them to apply.
The Independent Contractor
The law does recognize that there is a relationship identified as
contractor -contractee. The contractee in this case being the one who let the
contract. By extension this is the owner for the purposes of this thesis.
This relationship is presumably the one that is desired by both parties
at the outset of a construction contract and if it is established as such, then
there is little doubt about the division of roles between the owner and the

















































Figure 6. Determination of Owner Status as Employer or Third Party.
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Independent Contractor Status Tested
Rich Hill Coal Co. et al. v. Bashore
,
334 Pa. 449, 7 A.2d 302, 1939
provides the following confirmation, "Where a contract is let for work to be
done by another in which the contractee reserves no control over the means
of it's accomplishment, but merely as to the result, the employment is an
independent one establishing the relation of contractee and contractor, and
not that of master and servant." Both the master -servant relationship and
the normal contractor-contractee relationship were examined in this case.
The court in Rich Hill Coal Co. held that the master-servant relationship did
exist as identified by the above and forced the group of coal companies to
accept the Workmen's Compensation Act. The case quoted and served to
reaffirm the decision in Holbrook v. Wilkes-Barre. 309 Pa. 586. 164 A. 719,
1933. which also identified control over the means of accomplishment of the
work as the salient feature in the decision.
In a similar case, more recently, a radio station hired a contractor and
an employee of that contractor was injured moving some radio equipment
around. While it did concern radio equipment, the contract was for the
movement of the radio equipment and the radio station did not attempt to
direct the manner or way the work was to be done other than to specify the
final desired result in the contract. Therefore the court held that a
contractor-contractee relationship existed between the radio station and the
contractor, thus making the contractor liable as the employer for workmen's
compensation. The court also ruled that because moving the radio
equipment was not part of the normal business of the radio station, the
station was also not a statutory employer and thus the contractor was an
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independent contractor instead of being a sub -contractor who could look to
the station as a prime, Freeny v. William Penn Broadcasting Co. 180
Super.Ct. 434, 1 18 A.2d 275. 1955.
Degree of Control
It is not always easy to make this determination. This is the case even
where the contracting parties have established a contractual relationship by
language that specifically declares that the contractor is an independent
contractor. In Eggleston v. Leete 186 Super.Ct. 542. 142 A.2d 777, 1958, a
woodcutter under contract to a sawmill for a specified amount of wood, cut
to specific lengths by type of tree, on land owned by that sawmill, and using
a road cut by another contractor for that sawmill, but otherwise on his own
by the conditions of the contract, was injured when a tree he had cut fell the
wrong way. The sawmill wanted the woodcutter classified as an
independent contractor, as the contract stipulated. The woodcutter felt he
was an employee. The court stated that, "the designation given a claimant
by an alleged employer is not conclusive as to whether he is an employee or
an independent contractor...when a reasonable view of the evidence
warrants finding that they were employees." The court found that, "there
eiisted the right or authority to control in this case which tips the status
scale to that of an employee." The most significant pieces of data were the
requirement for specific dimensions, ownership of the land and the road




This principle is also found in the 1942 case of Shields v. William
Freihofer Baking Co. which states, " Whatever one may be termed, the
ultimate determination of the relationship depends on the degree of control
in any given situation." The court found that a bakery goods distributor was
an employee because he was engaged in the normal course of the bakery's
business even though his relationship with the bakery was as a contracted
distributor.
Limitations to Contractual Language
The issue can not be forced just with contractual language,
irrespective of the subsequent actions of the parties. This is important
because it places the determination squarely back into the realm of the four
criteria for master-servant or the three criteria for statutory employer
(covered later in this chapter). The owner must be judicious in the writing
of the contract and in subsequent actions. Post award actions that satisfy
either set of "employer" criteria can overule even the plain language of the
contract.
Of special interest is the case of Bogan v. Smoothway Construction Co.
183 Super .Ct. 170, 130 A.2d 207. 1957. In this case a truck driver was
killed during the unloading of his cargo, a water tank, as he helped the
construction workers at the site lower the tank to the ground. The facts of
the case clearly showed that the driver was an independent contractor who
had been contracted to deliver the tank. The decision indicated that the
driver was outside his contract responsibilities when he proceeded to help
with the unloading of the tank after delivery. Because he helped at the
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request of Smoothway constructions crane operator and was not in charge of
the unloading but was in the same capacity as the usual crane operator's
assistant, helping to steady the tank, the judge found that the four criteria
establishing a master-servant relationship were satisfied. The construction
company was liable for the compensation because the driver was killed
while in their employ.
Requirements for a Status Change
While not specifically addressed in the case, it is also interesting to
note the short time span required to change from the status of independent
contractor, to the status of employee. The actions of Smoothway quickly
gave them the burden of assumption of liability in the case of injury. This
lends strong credence to the wisdom of a supervisor who, sensing such an
occurrence, and not desiring to assume that responsibility, acts to
immediately stop the work in progress until it is properly sorted out. While
less informed individuals may view this as overreacting, it clearly would
have saved Smoothway some money if this had been done. By extension, the
owner must be especially cognizant of his own actions, when on the site in an
inspection capacity, as the assumption of employer status can occur quickly.
Over -ruling the plain language of the contract is rare in most types of
legal disputes. This is presumably because the parties in question have truly
stated their intent in the language of the contract. If this were not so then
they would not have signed it. In the case of disputes over liability for
injuries though, common law and workmen's compensation statutes (noted
previously as generally being in contravention of common law principles)
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compete for precedence and the large amounts of money potentially
involved often encourage one party or the other to seek help from every
possible twist of the law. Thus, when actions are not in accordance with the
previously written contract, it is possible to rule in cases like Eggelston v.
Leete that the real intent is determined by the actions of the parties or by
their acceptance among both parties.
The owner in a construction contract must realize that change of status
can occur, and is in fact likejy to occur, if proper conditions are met.
Therefore the owner must not feel that either "obvious intent" to merely
contract or even specific language in his contract will be sufficient protection
to avoid a status change. The owner must also remain cognizant of his
actions and those of his agents (see below) that they do not become the basis
for a determination of unexpected or unwanted employer status.
Rental Equipment With Operators
Rental equipment that comes with operators forms a unique category
that is often present in the construction environment. The rental equipment
is on site by virtue of a contract with the vehicle's owner and the operator
comes with it as an employee of the vehicle owner who pays the operators
salary. This appears to present a possible problem with the definitions that
have been developed above. It has. however, already been tested and quite
consistently forms a subset of the independent contractor set of rules
described above.
The contractor-contractee relationship holds as long as the parties
have not negated it by their actions. This is verified in both OConnell v.
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Roefaro 391 Pa. 52, 137 A.2d 325. 1958, and in Mature v. Angelo (which is
cited in O'Connell v. Roefaro) 373 Pa. 593, 97 A.2d 59, 1953. The decisions
state that merely designating the work that is to be done without specifying
the method or manner of accomplishment does not establish control or an
employer-employee relationship. The examples used include pointing out
the location of holes to be dug, identifying a set of beams to be moved and
hiring a taxi. These actions were held to not constitute the exercise of the
right of specifying the way and manner of the work to be done. Therefore
the operator remains as the employee of the vehicle owner and not the
employee of the renter of the equipment.
This presumes the renter will brief the equipment operators once they
are on site and not direct the "methods" used to accomplish the identified
task(s). A question arises when considering the situation of the renter
remaining to exercise more specific control over the rented equipment's
operation.
Role Reversal
The above situation has also been tested and has been found to be
sufficient to reverse the roles and create for the equipment operator a status
of employee of the renter and create for the equipment renter the status of
employer. In Ramondo v. Ramondo, 169 Super.Ct. 102. 82 A.2d 40. 1951. the
renter, a construction contractor, used the rented equipment (with their
provided operators) along with his other equipment (some of which was
owned but some of which was other rental equipment). There was no
discernable difference in the eyes of the court with the methods of direction
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used (Renters superintendent or foreman told them "what we want done")
between the various pieces of equipment. Therefore the construction
contractor was found to have assumed employer status for ail the operators
of the rental equipment.
Even more convincing and in this instance involving a public
municipality, is the case of Doyle v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 153
Super.Ct. 61 1. 34 A.2d 812. 1943. The equipment was operated by a
township and the township employed an operator for the equipment. The
Pennsylvania Department of Highways contracted with the township for the
use of the equipment (a roller) and the operator. The "Commonwealth
written" contract reserved, for the Commonwealth, the right to use the
equipment when, where and as required by the Department of Highways.
What might have appeared to the Commonwealth's contract writers as a
necessary clause to ensure control, captured for them the employer's liability
in the case of injury. This case also confirmed the doctrine of the 4 -criteria
test relating to the designation of the employer. The Commonwealth, by its
contract language and subsequent actions in accordance with that language,
satisfied the 4 criteria. The court's ruling held that the Department of
Highways became the employer of the operator for workmen's compensation
purposes.
Application to the Owner
The Department of Highways had started out with a contractor -
contractee relationship and from the case it is evident that they intended to
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maintain that. However, that intent fell before the status change that
accompanies the satisfaction of the 4-criteria test.
The owner is also vulnerable to a similar status change. The well-
established doctrine of the contractor-contractee relationship will not stand
before the case law that establishes employer status with these four criteria,
regardless of how earnest and well-documented the intent to the contrary.
This exclusion of original intent, in favor of intent demonstrated by
subsequent actions, overules even the language of the contract document
itself.
The Statutory Employer
The relationship of statutory employer was developed in Chapter 2.
Briefly, the statutory employer is one who is identified as the employer for
the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act by the force of the
statutes and not by his role as identified by the existence of. or lack of. a
master-servant relationship.
Section 203 of the Act defines the concept and as noted in Chapter 2.





2. Occupation/Control of the "premises''
3. Engagement on or about the employer's normal business.
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This 3-criteria test has been graphically represented in Figure 6,
showing it's relation to both the 4-criteria. master-servant test, and to third
party status determination points.
Owner Options
One of the potential traps for an owner is to be positioned in such a
way as to satisfy the "statutory employer" status and thus relieve the
contractor of employer status. The owner would then be accepting the
Workmen's Compensation Act liabilities.
Conversely, an owner exposed to a large financial vulnerability as a
result of a third party action may desire protection from that unlimited
process and cut expected losses by hiding behind the shield of the caps on
compensation imposed by the Workmen's Compensation Act. This can be
done if the owner can prove statutory employer eligibility and then under
exclusive remedy, relieve itself of third party liability.
Because this is a different category than the normal "employer" status
it is treated separately. Either category may apply and both may be raised
in a given case if one party is particularly desirous of a determination
relative to employer status one way or the other. That party could request




Determination of Owner Status Using
the 3 -Criteria Test
In determining when an owner may become a statutory employer the
court will look at the three criteria for statutory employer status. It is
important to note that these criteria are different than those used for
employer-employee status determinations. However, in some cases a litigant
may be eligible to try for both determinations if the situation is uncertain
enough to make the appropriate category unclear.
The First Criterion of the 3 -Criteria Test
The first criterion, and the principal difference between the category
of employer-employee and statutory employer determination, is the
existence of a contractual relationship. As explained earlier, this contractual
relationship usually involves prime contractor/sub -contractor contracts. In
Pennsylvania this has largely been interpreted to read that the prime
contractor is the statutory employer. However, every independent
contractor, hired by an owner also has a contractual relationship with that
owner. As noted in the section under independent contractors, the language
of the contract does not necessarily stand firm on it's own. Post award
actions tend to overrule the specific language of the contract. The first
criteria of becoming a statutory employer is potentially satisfied by the




It was previously shown that the law seeks to preserve the
contractor-contractee relationship if the parties do nothing to change that.
From the owners perspective the document that establishes this contractor-
contractee relationship also opens the judicial door to possible statutory
employer status. To avoid that designation, the owner must look to the other
two criteria and ensure that they are not also satisfied by subsequent
actions.
The Second Criterion of the 3 -Criteria Test
The second criterion, like the first, is somewhat camouflaged. The
owner owns and controls the premises prior to the construction contract.
Therefore the owner potentially satisfies criterion number two by
simply contracting with the construction contractor and not making
additional arrangements. To avoid satisfying the second criterion, control of
the premises should pass to the contractor, at least for the immediate area of
the work. This may seem uncomfortable to the owner who will be tempted
to retain some control, but if control is maintained, then only the third
criterion which avoids the statutory employer status and liability is left.
The Third Criterion of the 3 -Criteria Test
The third criterion is not as likely to be satisfied as the first two were.
It is still a possibility, although it is the most likely criterion to remain
unsatisfied in a normal contractor-contractee relationship.
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"In the course of the normal business" is highly subjective and should
be respected as such. Some guidelines do apply, though, as was indicated in
chapter 2. One of the most crucial is the subject of maintenance. Because it
has been held that this is in the normal course of a business, the owner must
be careful about the lines between new construction, renovation and
maintenance. Thomas v. Bache, 351 Pa. 220, 40 A.2d 495, 1945 and Davis v.
City of Philadelphia, 153 Pa.Super 645. 35 A.2d 77, 1944. It will be the
judge's and not the owners definition that will decide the case. The owner
should not presume that the judge will be unskilled at making a
determination or that the court will be easily fooled about the duties of a
contracted maintenance "employee."
The Owner as Statutory Employer
The designation of an owner as the statutory employer for individuals
that were hired as independent contractors is rare. However, exceptions
occur as the following cases will demonstrate.
In Hauger v. Walker Co. 277 Pa. 506, 121 A. 200, 1923. an expert
mechanic was called in to repair machinery when the repair required was
beyond the capabilities of the Walker Company's own personnel. The
mechanic died, as a result of an accident, and the court determined that
repairs on its machinery were a part of the normal business of the company.
Therefore, statutory owner status applied, making the company liable for
workmen's compensation for the dead mechanic.
In McGrath v. Pennsylvania Sugar Co. 282 Pa. 265. 127 A. 780, 1925.
the Sugar company, a refiner of sugar, tried to hide behind statutory
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employer status to avoid tort liability, when a stevedore working for a
loading contractor was injured. The court found that loading was not a part
of the normal business of refining sugar and held the sugar company liable
under common law as a third party.
In DeNardo v. Seven Baker Bros.. 102 Super.Ct. 347. 156 A. 725. 1931.
the court established an employer-employee relationship for the driver of a
bread delivery truck despite the Seven Baker Brothers' claim that he was an
independent contractor. However, the DeNardo v. Seven Baker Bros, decision
was countered in 1944 in D'Allesandro v. Barfield 348 Pa. 328, 35 A.2d 412,
because the second criterion of statutory employer status, control of the
premises where the injury occurred, was not satisfied. The other 2 criteria
were satisfied by the case and both cases pointed to the necessity of
satisfying all 3 criteria.
In the previously mentioned Freeny v. William Penn Broadcasting Co.,
the owner avoided statutory employer status when the court found that
"moving radio equipment" was not in the normal course of the business of
radio broadcasting. The owner was not the statutory employer because the
third criteria was not satisfied.
Finally, in Reiter v. Garman 107 Super.Ct. 269, 163 A. 74. 1932. the
owner of a mine was held liable under the Act for injuries sustained to a
contract miner because the miner was on the premises, engaged in the
normal course of the mining business and the owner, by all accounts, was
exercising control of the mine and the mining operation. Both master-
servant and statutory employer terminology were used in the courts
decision with the final result indicating a statutory employer relationship.

99
Attempts to Abuse the System
It is important to recognize that the courts are not blind to the inverse
side of the issue of statutory employer status. An owner who recognizes that
actions prior to an injury have created a liability as a negligent third party
cannot expect to attempt to easily become the statutory employer.
The Westinghouse Cases
It was recognized years ago that the growing third party liability
awards started making the capped liability of the employer attractive to
third parties, in some cases. Therefore the courts have held that there is,
"...very great care which must be exercised before allowing an employer to
avoid his liability at common law by asserting that he is a statutory
employer. Section 203 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which was
designed to extend benefits to workers, should not be casually converted
into a shield behind which negligent employers may seek refuge.
",
Stipanovich v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 210 Super.Ct. 98, 231 A.2d
894. 1967.
Note the dual use of the term employer, in reference to Westinghouse
who was occupying a role as the owner with regard to the construction
(renovation and relocation specifically) of some machinery. Stipanovich was
an employee of the contractor that Westinghouse contracted with for the
renovation and relocation task. The failure to prove that this renovation
and relocation was a part of the normal business of Westinghouse caused the
court to deny Westinghouse s contention that it was the statutory employer.
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This forced Westinghouse to accept a previously adjudicated settlement
under negligent third party liability.
The concept was also tried before a federal jury, that same year, in
Jamison v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 375 F.2d 465. 1967. This time
it involved a painter who fell to his death. The jury could not agree with
Westinghouse that the painter was engaged in the normal business of
Westinghouse and would not allow Westinghouse to assume the mantle of
statutory employer. Nonetheless. Westinghouse pursued the matter to the
Court of Appeals where it lost again. The Court of Appeals did seem to give
some credence to the concept that the painter could have been engaged in
the normal course of business. However, the court rested its decision on the
fact that Westinghouse did not prove the relationship of the painting to the
normal course of business. Note that preventive maintenance painting, such
as for rust prevention, would not necessarily be excluded!
Early Foundation for Limiting Abuse of the System
The effort expended in pursuing these cases was considerable and the
benefit to case law of these recent, clear decisions is unquestionable, yet
despite Westinghouse's persistence, the principle was actually established in
recognizable form thirty years previously and perhaps should not have been
so strongly contested. The case in question is McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co.
302 Pa. 287. 153 A. 424, 1930.
Levinson Steel Co. had contracted for the erection of a steel building
on land that they controlled. When a steelworker was injured they moved to
avoid tort liability by claiming they were the statutory employer. All three
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criteria were apparently satisfied; contractual relationship, the injury
occurred on their premises and Levinson was normally in the business of
erecting steel. However the court ruled against Levinson, forcing them to
accept common law tort liability instead of workmen's compensation
liability. In finding against Levinson, the court made a specific point of
noting that Levinsons normal course of business did not include that
building, as it was under contract, and that in the eyes of the court the
statutory employer "contractual relationship" must be one of prime and sub-
contractor, which this was not.
The decision in this case allowed 5 criteria as opposed to the 3
established by this authors thesis. However, 3 of those 5 criteria involve
contractual specifics and the remaining 2 are identical to the authors 3-
criteria test.
The specifics of the "contractual relationship" do not hold up as well in
subsequent decisions. Currently, any contractual relationship appears
sufficient for consideration. However, the owner should take careful note of
the courts definition of "normal course of business." It reflects the same
perspective expressed in the Westinghouse cases and serves to limit owner
access to statutory employer status.
This case served to reverse some of the trend noted in the previously
enumerated cases where the courts attempted to find the owner responsible
as statutory employer. The fact that this owner was known to be facing a
greater tort liability, in negligence proceedings, appears to have been a
factor. The same outcome is observed in the previously mentioned McGrath
v. Pennsylvania Sugar Co. where the owner also had a large common law tort
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action pending and tested the statutory employer provision by attempting to
duck behind it.
Other Special Cases Affecting Employer Status - Agency
and Knowledge of Skills
There are two special cases that affect the owner's possible
assumption of employer status. One special case is agency, having someone
else act in the owner's name. The other special case is the level of
knowledge possessed by the owner, of the skills applicable to the injured
employee's tasks.
Agency
It is important to consider the concept of agency. Briefly mentioned in
the preceding paragraphs, there is a question of when agency may occur in
the context of this research.
The owner will customarily employ several individuals who may act
as his agent with regard to specific duties. These include inspectors,
engineers and contract administrators. Agency as a function of their jobs as
assigned by their employer, the owner, is assumed. Defining when someone
is or is not an agent is outside the scope of this thesis. However, agency by
these individuals as it defines the identity of the employer for workmen's
compensation is intrinsic to this topic.
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Agency Defining the Owners Role
The answer to the basic question, If agency is established can this
change the employer designation?" is found in Busch v. Bientzle, 1 19
Super .Ct. 559, 181 A. 2d 520, 1935. The court states,"...if an agent, with
authority, either expressly or impliedly, employs help for the benefit of his
principal's business, he creates the relationship of employer and employee
between such help and his principal."
In the previously mentioned Bogan v. Smoothway (covered in the
independent contractor section) the truck driver, unquestionably an
independent contractor up to that point, lost that status and became an
employee at the request of an employee (the crane operator) of Smoothway
construction. This employee successfully obtained the drivers help in
steadying the water tank that had previously been the truck driver's cargo.
The link to Smoothway Construction Company was the determination that
the employee of Smoothway acted in an agent status and effectively had
"hired" the driver for Smoothway at that time.
Therefore, the conclusion is reached that an agent of the principal (i.e.
an employee) can impose upon his employer an employer-employee
relationship with someone that the agent employs. However, several
conditions must apply.
The Conditions for a Status Change
Principally there must be authority. Note in Busch v. Bientzle the
mention of either express or implied authority. This is really the key point.
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In Corbin v. George 308 Pa. 201, 162 A. 459, 1932, a company car driven by
a non-company driver injured a mother walking home with her children.
The judge ruled that there was no authority for agency with which to attach
the driver to the company. Therefore, there was no establishment of the
employer-employee relationship, since the master-servant relationship upon
which it is based can not be imposed on a person (in this case, the company)
without consent, express or implied.
Secondarily there must be employment. Voluntary work and
incidental employment, treated elsewhere in this paper, still do not count.
The other elements used to determine the master servant relationship (4
criteria) or the statutory employer relationship (3 criteria) remain
applicable.
Finally, as noted in Chapter 2. there is a special exception in
emergencies. White v. Consumers Finance Service, Inc. 339 Pa. 417, 15 A.2d
142, 1940 affirmed that if an employee acting under emergency conditions
hired help and the help was injured, the original employees employer
would be held liable for compensation since the emergency conditions
created an implied authority as an agent to hire help to protect the principal
employer's interest. In this case the judge ruled that a stalled vehicle was
not an emergency and therefore agency was denied.
The other special case, one that is mostly used as a defense in efforts
to avoid employer status, is the presentation of facts that the supposed
employer could not be the employer because of a lack of the necessary skills
to supervise the injured employee. Neglecting the rather subjective topic of
"sufficiency of management skills" for which the author found no
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documentation of a trial in court, this appears at first glance to be a good and
sufficient defense. It is neither.
In Potash v. Bonaccurso, 179 Super.Ct. 582, 1 17 A.2d 803, 1959, the
issue was specifically put to the test. The ruling stated in part, " The fact
that a particular occupation may involve such technical skills that the
employer is wholly incapable of supervising the details of performance does
not preclude a master-and-servant status." The ruling went on to propose as
examples the employment of a cook in a business where the employer knew
nothing of cooking, or the retention of a doctor or a lawyer on somebody's
staff. It was even noted that in the case of cooks and perhaps gardeners the
contract for employment may specifically state a level of non-interference
and that such a clause would no! be sufficient to defer the master-servant
relationship. Although not specifically stated in that decision, it clearly
applies the doctrine established in the master-servant criteria of the
existence of the "rights" as being sufficient to establish the relationship, as
opposed to the actual exercise of those rights
Two Strategies for Making the Owner an Employer
Generally it was shown that the owner is protected from employer
status in Pennsylvania. This protection appears to be significantly more
complete and well established than is evidenced in similar cases nationwide.
However, there remain two types of cases where there are parties interested
in identifying the owner as the employer, even in Pennsylvania.
The first arises when the contractor is small and insufficiently
prepared to accept responsibility as the employer. Accepting this
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responsibility allows prior preparation with a full knowledge of the costs and
subsequent immunity from tort liability. This is attractive and most prime
construction contractors should endeavor to be identified as the employer.
This is desired by the wording of the statutes and is the normal course of
events. However, if after the injury, the contractor is financially weak with
regard to the compensation, and there is no significant threat of third-party
liability beyond the compensation limits, then an act to have the owner's
status changed from contractee to employer could be attractive.
Secondly, the owner may wish to hide behind the protection of the
compensation caps as demonstrated in Westinghouse Electric, Levinson Steel
and Pennsylvania Sugar Company cases. This occurs when third party
liability is likely because of either reasonable cause based on the owners
actions, or because the deep pockets approach is being used by the injured
party. In either case, the owner may find that the third party stakes are
high enough to warrant seeking liability as owner, and the protection of
exclusive remedy, to avoid the uncapped result of a tort action.
Summary
The solution to defining the owner as either the employer or a third
party is the application of the tests as the courts have developed them. For
an employer-employee relationship the 4-criteria test of "Hiring. Firing.
Timing and Methodology" is used. If all 4 parts are satisfied then master-
servant status is confirmed and an employer-employee relationship exists
with respect to the Workmen's Compensation Act.
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If a contractual relationship exists the primary focus becomes the 3-
criteria test; "contractual relationship, control of premises and normal course
of business." If all 3 criteria are satisfied then a statutory employer
relationship exists. However, the perspective of the courts was shown to
have changed from that of the original cases. The earlier decisions
construed these criteria loosely and tended to force the statutory status and
subsequent liability onto owners who otherwise had no liability. More
recent decisions, coming after McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co.. have used a
much stricter definition of the criteria with the result that owners faced with
larger third-party, common law tort liability have been unable to avail
themselves of the liability caps and exclusive remedy protection afforded by
the Workmen's Compensation Act.
In all cases, and especially in attempts by owners to avoid tort
liability, the concept of the independent contractor-contractee relationship
was reaffirmed by the courts. It can be overruled by post award actions
that create a master-servant status and hence an employer-employee
relationship, but it was never excluded from consideration relative to the
decision.
It has been shown that agency is fully effective in determining
workmen's compensation status, carrying the same weight that it has in
other legal disputes. Rental equipment, with operators, is a special case in
construction but is resolved uniformly with the other workmen's
compensation issues, using the same sets of criteria. Lastly, it was noted that
a lack of technical knowledge is not a successful defense in attempting to






This research has identified the elements that determine the liability
of an owner in the event of a construction contract worker's injury. The
roles of employer and third party were examined and the liability associated
with each role was discussed.
The focus of the research, the determination of whether the owner is
the employer or a third party, was covered in Chapter 4. Two sets of test
criteria were identified and case law validating their applicability was cited.
Summary
The following sections summarize and conclude this thesis. The topics
are drawn together and recommendations are made with application to both
the general case and to the laboratory example.
The Safety Liability Environment
It was shown at the outset of this work that the current safety and
safety management literature had not developed a focus on the issue of the
owners liability following the occurrence of a construction worker injury. In
fact the entire subject of liability for injury to construction workers was
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notable by it's general absence in all the current and leading works that
were reviewed.
The impression that this author was given, during study of these
references, was that the various authors were inadvertently developing a
theorem that may not ever actually occur, even if it did appear to be a
desirous end result to safety investigations, as a whole. The theorem in
question appeared to suggest that if sufficiently strong measures were taken,
the accident problem would either go away completely or at least vanish into
insignificance. Therefore, the liability question could be shelved and
ignored.
The Proof of the Problem
A safety survey was conducted to examine, first-hand, the current
extent of the safety problem, on contemporary construction sites. A
considerable number of OSHA safety violations were observed. Many
included an imminent risk of serious or fatal worker injury.
It was observed that safety consciousness was a function of the
individual site and that the site superintendents' varied approaches were
mirrored in the daily conditions on the sites. It was also observed that there
were numerous safety hazards which were capable of being corrected with
proper attention.
The conclusion was reached that the owner should not assume that
its construction sites were safe. The individually varying conditions and
ample supply of hazards did not represent a situation where it was
reasonable to assume that nothing would ever happen. The OSHA standards
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were developed through study of painful and often tragic circumstances.
The lack of an injury at a given moment is not as persuasive as the history of
how a given hazard contributed to someone else's suffering in the past. The
sites examined during this study were not safe, though they may continue to
remain lucky.
The Need for the Research Reviewed
If the sites are not safe, and if a worker may be injured, then the
question for this thesis is raised. What is the owners liability after the fact?
How can it be predicted so that it isn't erroneously assumed when it
shouldn't be?
The question became one of definition. The liability of the various
parties after a construction contract worker's injury is directly related to the
role that the party in question had assumed up to that point.
The Owner's Roles
There were three relationships defined that produced the roles with
which the owner could conceivably be identified. They were:
(1) Employer-Employee Relationship
(2) Independent Contractor-Contractee Relationship
(3) Statutory Employer-Employee Relationship
Each relationship has different liabilities and vulnerabilities in the
case of a construction accident. It was shown that in the case of two of the
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relationships the owner would be classified an "employer". In the other case
the owner was a third party to the injured worker.
The Employer's Liability
The liability of the employer role was covered in Chapter 2. The
employer's, and statutory employer's (when that classification applies),
liabilities are covered under Pennsylvania's Workmen's Compensation Act.
This act forces the employer to accept responsibility and liability in case of
an injury, regardless of where that liability may be presumed to have fallen
if a common law, tort action had been fought.
This enforced responsibility was designed to ensure that the injured
worker was properly compensated and didn't become an innocent victim of a
shrewdly fought legal battle among experts that had lost sight of the
worker's perspective in the issue. The courts ruled that liberal construction
in favor of compensating the worker was to be balanced with a strict
interpretation of the statutes, in all other regards, because the statute was
not in accordance with existing common law principles.
Exclusive Remedy
The employer was given the privilege of exclusive remedy to parallel
the statutory requirement to accept responsibility. The employer's liability
in dollar value was strictly capped and detailed in amendments. The net
result was that the employee could not hope to recover as much under the
Workmen's Compensation Act from the employer as would have been
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possible in a successful tort action against the employer for negligence.
Furthermore, the exclusive remedy provision did not allow the employee to
sue the employer for any further costs outside of the limits set forth under
the Act.
Statutory Employer Liability
The employer was also held to be responsible for the subcontractors
hired to prosecute the work of the project on which they were employed.
This required satisfaction of a 3-item set of criteria that included a
contractual relationship, control of the premises and an employee injured
while engaged in the normal course of the statutory employers business.
Once these criteria were satisfied, that party became the statutory employer
which required acceptance of all the responsibilities of the employer in the
usual sense.
Minor Points Related to Employer Liability
If the employment could be categorized as "incidental," the Workmens
Compensation Act did not apply and the only remedies available were in the
common law arena. But if the employee was a minor, the full force of the
compensation act did apply with the solitary exception of a case where the
young employee was fatally injured and the parents had not had a previous
opportunity to accept or reject the Workmen's Compensation Act. In this
case the parents could make the decision after the fact. This privilege
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allowed them to pursue a tort action against the owner or take the
compensation if that was more lucrative.
The amount the employee received under the act did not cover all the
expenses, only a portion of them. This meant that tort actions against third
parties who could be proven negligent remain an attractive means of making
up the difference between a family's income prior to the accident and the
amount provided by the compensation.
The Liability of the Third Party
In Chapter 3 the liability of the owner in a third party suit was
examined. It was noted that the employee could almost always find a
sufficient cause of action against the owner with which to bring the matter to
trial. It was also noted that, in Pennsylvania, neither the employer nor the
employers insurance carrier could initiate an action against the owner for
negligence. This was regardless of any compensation amounts they may have
paid to the injured employee or whether the owner was negligent or not.
Subrogation and Related Points
Under the right of subrogation, either the employer or the insurer,
whoever had paid the compensation award, could join an existing suit by the
employee against the owner. Once joined, the employer, or insurer, had first
rights to the amount recovered by the employee in the lawsuit, up to the
amount paid out by them in compensation. The employee would receive the
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excess amount and was deemed fairly compensated by virtue of already
having received the compensation award.
This put the owner in the position of having to pay the entire amount
if found to be sufficiently negligent. Then it was shown that, in
Pennsylvania, unlike some other states that have proceeded with tort
reform, "sufficiently negligent" to be responsible for the whole amount could
be as little as 10%. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that it can't be
even lower than that. Effectively, the owner is liable for the complete
amount of damages if proven, in court, to be the least bit negligent.
In some states the employee is forced to "elect" one course or the
other, either compensation or a tort action. This was not applicable to
Pennsylvania. The employee could immediately receive compensation from
the employer or insurer and concurrently seek additional amounts through
an action against third parties which could easily involve the owner.
Negligence
Negligence was shown to form the basis for all vulnerability to
liability that the owner, as a third party, might face. It was discussed in a
general sense and it was noted that the determination is a subjective one
that is usually given over to the jury for a decision. However, through a
condensation of several works, the author presented a five part guideline for
the owner. This guideline may help increase awareness of major scenarios
that have held the most risk of an assumption of liability, due to negligence.
These five guidelines were described as ( 1 ) selection of the contractor,
(2) provision of anything, especially tools, equipment or the site, (3) control
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of the job, whether exercised or just retained administratively, (4) vicarious,
nondelegable duties to the employee for extra-hazardous types of work and
(5) ratification of an unsafe condition by the action of approving it.
Practically speaking, some of the techniques that are most useful in
administering a contract construction job and ensuring the results that are
desired, are also avenues that increase the owners vulnerability to
subsequent liability in the event of an accident injuring a worker. The
owner has a tough decision to make.
OSHA Violations
OSHA regulations did not increase the vulnerability of the owner. A
strong and consistent set of case law that said OSHA violations were not a
sufficient cause of action in themselves. While it did not rule out OSHA
violations being used as one of a number of indicators of negligence in tort
proceedings, it did eliminate the possibility of liability merely because an
OSHA violation could be identified as a proximate cause of the accident.
Indemnification
The second factor, in the owner's favor, was shown to be indemnity.
Perhaps the most important defense against liability, indemnity is the
privilege of the contract writer, who is usually the owner.
The indemnity clause allows the owner to forestall the subrogation
right of the employer or insurer by having them sign away that right with
the language of the indemnity clause in the contract. Despite all other
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precedent or common sense to the contrary, a precisely written,
unambiguous indemnity clause will almost always win over all other factors.
The contract is taken to show the intent of the parties and when that
contractual intent is clear, it holds up.
While 20 years ago, indemnity was mostly a matter of avoiding
reimbursement of subrogated compensation claims, recent court actions
were cited that hold a valid form of extended indemnity exists that allows
the owner to pass the entire judgement on to the indemnifying contractor.
Because this allows the owner to escape payment of damages, even
when negligently responsible for the injury, the courts have been very strict
in allowing it. However, with a properly written clause, very clearly and
expressly identifying that the owner is completely indemnified, even for his
own negligence, the indemnification can stand up in court.
The owner must remain aware, though, that any interpretation of the
clause that will deny this privilege will be used, because clauses are
construed against the author of the document. It also goes against
established principles of common law that would otherwise spread the
judgement for payment more appropriately.
The Determination of Roles
Having already covered the liability of both the employer and the
third party. Chapter 4 addressed the question of when the owner played
each role. This question was the original point of interest for this thesis and
it was noted as particularly important because of the large differences in the
amount of financial liability that were attached to each of the two roles.
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The definition of the two roles was inextricably woven into the fabric
of the wording of the Workmen's Compensation Act. This was validated by
subsequent decisions in the courts.
The Act defined the employer-employee relationship as one of a
master and a servant. Considerable amounts of case law were devoted to
interpreting this phrase which had its basis in common law. Through an
examination of the existing case law, a 4-criteria test emerged for defining a
master-servant relationship.
The Criteria Tests and "Rights''
The master-servant 4-criteria test included the power or right over:
(1) hiring the employee. (2) firing or discharging the employee, (3) timing of
the sequences of work and (4) methodology of the work. It was expressly
shown that no exercise of any of these was required as long as the
prospective employer had the RIGHT of control over them.
While all four criteria are considered necessary in most cases, it was
also shown that several cases appeared to establish a subjective ranking of
importance which was roughly the inverse of the way they were presented
above. In fact, 2 cases showed that only the third and fourth criteria were
necessary for a determination of owner status.
The role of the independent contractor was discussed as it relates to
the owner. It was noted that this is the normal relationship between an
owner and a construction contractor. Several cases were presented that
dealt with special situations where the independence of the contractor was
an issue. One specific type of special situation, with repeated application to
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construction contracts, that of the operator of rental equipment, was given
extra treatment. However, it was noted that there were no unusual points of
law. The same 4-criteria test continued to apply.
The companion role of the statutory employer was discussed and it
was shown that the 3-criteria test developed in Chapter 2 continued to hold.
If the owner satisfied these criteria then the statutory employer role
applied. It was further shown that in the early years after passage of the
Act, the court cases tended to involve owners attempting to avoid the
statutory employer designation.
More recent cases, with the spectre of unlimited tort liability waiting
in the wings, have produced owners trying mightily, though generally in
vain, to establish for themselves a status of statutory employer. This would
allow them to avoid third party liability under exclusive remedy statutes.
Agency and Skills
Completing chapter 4, agency was shown to be valid with regard to
this thesis topic, a factor that must be considered by owners that employ
contract administrators and inspectors. There was no special limitation on
this agency, so the full measure of liability may be applied to the owner as a
result of an agents actions. Additionally, it was shown that lack of sufficient
knowledge or skills, with which to supervise an injured employees work, is




The owner can be liable as the employer or statutory employer, for
amounts defined by the Workmen's Compensation statutes, if the owners
actions satisfy either the three-criteria statutory employer or the four-
criteria master-servant tests. Failing this, the owner is vulnerable to being
named, as a defendant, by the injured employee, or his estate, in a common
law tort action. If named in such a suit and found negligent, the owner can
expect to pay the entire compensation amount (back to the employer or
insurer, under their subrogation rights) as well as any additional damages
awarded for negligence, pain and suffering or punitive punishment. The
owner's defenses are a properly written indemnification clause, which will
force the indemnifying contractor to pay the judgement, and actions, prior to
the injury, which avoid any attachment of negligence.
The owner should expect the role of defendant third party in most
injury situations occurring in Pennsylvania. Several large, powerful,
corporations have already failed to avoid tort liability by attempting
defenses alleging employer or statutory employer status. The majority of
recent test cases indicate that the courts will limit an owners attempts to
use these roles for avoiding proper responsibility..
A pplication of the Above Findings to
The Laboratory Example: Penn State
Penn State is actually in a fairly good position relative to injury
liability. Most of the appropriate measures are already in place.
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As stated previously, the assumption is that the University does not
desire to escape liability that is appropriate to assume. Therefore the author
concludes that the University is not desirous of attempting to force an
employer or statutory employer designation.
Current Measures
If the above assumption is correct, it is considered appropriate that
the contract administration staff is small, inspects periodically, but does not
control the work on the sites. There is currently no reference in the
standard contract format which gives the University rights over hiring or
firing of the contractors employees. Therefore, the four-criteria master-
servant relationship would not apply.
Concurrently, it is clear from the fences, signs, contract language and
the author's site safety inspection observations that the site is controlled by
the contractor, rather than the University. While it is not clear in the
maintenance arena, the new construction sector is unlikely to be construed
as being within the normal course of the University's business. Therefore it
is again possible to conclude, with confidence, that the three-criteria
statutory employer test would not apply.
Assumption of Third Party Status
With both the employer and statutory employer tests failing to apply
to Penn State in it's current mode of operations, the University can expect to
shoulder the third party liability appropriate to any owner. Thus, the
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University can expect to be sued in a tort action for any injury that involves
any factor that could be shown as negligence on the part of the University.
As previously shown, the two defenses available to the owner, in the
event of a negligence suit launched by the injured employee, are to have
conducted itself with due regard to avoiding the assumption of negligence,
prior to the injury, and equipping the contract with a well-written indemnity
clause.
Indemnity Clause Review
Because of the greater assurance of payment associated with a
contractee such as a major university, it is quite conceivable that a
contractor may be induced to sign a contract with stricter liability for
indemnifying the owner than would normally be the case. In any event, the
author is not a lawyer, and recognizes a lack of preparation necessary to
comment on the merit of specific portions of a given indemnity clause but
this remains an area that should clearly receive attention from the owner, in
this case the University.
A review of the standard indemnity clause should be conducted by
the University's lawyers. This should be done with attention to the level of
risk the University is willing to assume as a trade-off against a clause that is
so dangerous to the contractor that the more knowledgeable ones
(presumably some of the better performers as well) would be threatened by
it and elect to avoid bidding the jobs.
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Avoiding the Assumption of Negligence
The University should examine where it may be producing scenarios
that provide for the assumption of negligence on the University's part.
These should be minimized wherever possible.
Active Negligence
Specifically, there should be a method for avoiding the selection of an
incompetent contractor. The author is aware that this is already in place.
The University contract administration staff routinely institutes contractor
pre-qualification for placement on the bidder's list.
Additionally, the University should carefully monitor all things
provided to the contractor. This includes tools, equipment, materials and the
site itself. Everything provided has a requirement that it work safely. If it
doesn't, then the provider is negligent. This is so well established that, if it
weren't for the occasional gains to be had in final product by providing some
parts or tools, it would be prudent not to provide anything at all. In fact
from the injury standpoint, it is unfortunate that the site must be provided.
Until the site has been changed completely by the construction process, the
provider of the site could easily find himself liable for any injury that
occurred there because of the existing conditions. A little pothole or icy
slope could result in expensive litigation. This is even more important if




The University must endeavor not to control the ways and means of
making progress with the work on the site. This is an issue for proper
training of the University's inspectors. As shown in Chapter 3. incidental or
periodic inspection is not a problem. The courts affirm the owners right to
try and verify the quality of the work. However, verification, and using that
knowledge to affect payment is different from using the inspection force to
ensure a quality product. The more enforcement that is occurring, the more
likelihood there is that control will be satisfied and because of agency, if the
inspector makes a mistake, the University is liable.
Vicarious Negligence
The definition of ultrahazardous and inherently dangerous work was
shown to be subjective and open to interpretation. The most probable result
is that basic, everyday construction will not be included in those categories
but there is no guarantee of that. Additionally, if the job is not strictly
routine and there is a question that it might fall into one of those two
categories, then the University should assume that it does. The case
examples included work on a pressure vessel, high rise work and work
similar to mining. If these satisfy the criteria, then many tasks performed as
construction at a major university will also. If this applies, it is non-
delegable (except by an indemnity clause) and the prudent course of
preparation would be to examine the University's insurance for coverage in
this area. It would be unwise to discover that the insurance company didn't




Finally, the University's contract administration branch should
examine all approvals that they perform and compare them to the possibility
of ratification of an unsafe condition, such as the foundation that failed
during construction, after being approved by the owner's engineer, as
discussed in Chapter 3.
Some approval is needed to ensure compliance with contract plans and
specifications. Lack of sufficient approval mechanisms could require a much
longer investment in time to completion or dissatisfaction with the end
product. However, every approval requirement that is deleted will reduce
ratification vulnerability and free up time for the members of the
University's own staff, who previously had to perform that review function.
The above recommendations on negligence do not purport to be the
fully inclusive list of recommendations or observations that can be made.
However, they do represent the author's carefully considered view of the
salient factors that apply to the area of interest of this thesis, as
demonstrated by the results of this research. It is in that spirit, and none
other, that they are presented.
Imminent Danger
A persistent question concerns the inspector or OPP employee who
observes an "imminent danger" safety violation. Is this negligence if the
safety violation is ignored? The author does not know. The case law
reviewed during this research was silent on the issue.
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Negligence is almost always a question for the jury. If previous
actions or contractual language established a duty in this regard then it is
reasonable to expect that a jury would view it as negligence. However, there
is no case law or precedent that the author is aware of that automatically
establishes such a duty. If there is no duty then it is likely that there would
be no negligence.
A reasonable course might be to warn the individual(s) in danger and
notify the site superintendent. They are the individuals who could be hurt
and who have a legal responsibility, respectively.
This issue is worthy of review by Penn State and investigation by
researchers. No comprehensive study of the safety responsibilities of the
engineer or inspector on the site (similar to this research of an owner's
responsibilities) has been published. In the interim, all owners should
review their inspection procedures and safety policies, with special emphasis
given to the uncertainties of this concern.
Safety Forms
The safety survey forms in the appendix were originally thought to
have some possible application to the University's safety inspection program.
The author specifically did not recommend such use for two reasons.
First, the forms were developed for generating data to be used by this
thesis with knowledge of the general types of sites that would be visited.
They were not developed for general application.
Secondly, as this thesis points out, it is not normally the owner's
responsibility to enforce OSHA, which these forms are based on, or even
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safety in general. However, increasing activity, of this kind, can increase the
likelihood of assuming responsibilities that can lead to third party negligence
suits. This is not recommended.
This stance was validated by the actions of the University's own
lawyers. They elected minimal participation and specifically advised the
University's OPP representative to reject receiving a copy of the forms
during the time of the safety survey. This occurred at the meeting when the
liability issue was first raised.
The Laboratory Example Summary
In summation, the author feels that the laboratory example is in good
shape with regard to it's current stance on construction contract injury
liability. However, the author would also recommend a conscientious review
of the standard indemnity clause, control or ratification possibilities by staff
qualifying as agents and all things provided by the University to the
contractors.
Recommendations
The general recommendations to the conscientious and honestly
motivated owner would take the form of the recommendations listed above
in the discussion of the laboratory example. In summary, they would be to
remain aware of employer and statutory employer criteria but not seek to
qualify thereunder, review the contract documents used, to ensure that a
sufficiently hardy indemnity clause is in place and look to the way your staff
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does business, while comparing it to actions that produce assumption of
liability for negligence and then minimizing them to whatever extent is
possible.
The Possibility of Completely Avoiding Liability
Recommendations to the owner who would seek to avoid any and all
liability would take a different approach. First of all, an assessment must be
made about your staffs chances of success in negligence reduction and your
lawyers chances of success at writing an ironclad, owner protecting,
indemnity clause that wont scare away every contractor capable of
completing the project.
If the assessment of these capabilities in your staff and lawyers is
high, then the absolutely least costly course is the one noted above, assuming
you never lose in court.
However, if the indemnity clause you have is expected to fail from
time to time and the staff can't be trusted to avoid liability for negligence,
then another course may be more profitable.
The Reverse Determination Option
This alternative course is not easy, and it has been tried by large
corporations who have failed in its application. But, it does have the




The intent would be to qualify as either the employer or statutory
employer. This would involve either payments to an insurance company or
self-insurance to cover the obligatory compensation costs. It is assumed the
owner would weigh these costs against the liability for negligence above
before making a determination to try for employer status.
The procedure would involve qualifying under either the 3-criteria or
4-criteria tests. Because the master-servant 4-criteria test involves hiring
and firing, the statutory employer 3-criteria test is believed to be the easier
route. However, either set of criteria, if satisfied, is equally good at capping
liability under the Act and qualifying for the exclusiveness of remedy
protections.
Both sets of criteria would involve control of the site and most
importantly, control of the work (4-criteria test) or that the work be part of
the normal course of the business (3-criteria test). For the normal course of
the business criteria, it would seem that a sufficiently ingenious company
organization could be a suitable answer. This would again indicate that the
3-criteria, statutory employer test, is probably the vehicle of choice.
Obviously the details would have to be adjusted based on the specifics of the
situation.
This route is not what appears to be intended for the owner by the
case law that the author has studied. It is definitely contrary to the
principles of moral responsibility that are the foundations of restitution
under common law. Accordingly, this method is not recommended by this
author. However, it is clearly an option, although it has proven largely
unsuccessful when tried by others.
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Possible Directions for Future Research
Several directions exist for possible future research. As noted above,
the question of "imminent danger" situations is not resolved. The duties of
an on-site inspector or engineer are not well established with regard to this
type of situation. Further research is required. However, there may not be
sufficient test cases, at the present time, with which to draw valid
conclusions. The specific actions that an inspector may or may not take
without establishing control is another possible area of research, although
this also appears to lack sufficient test cases at the current time.
The professional responsibilities of a third party's professional
engineer or architect, regarding safety liability, appears to have some
unanswered questions. Additionally, a corollary topic to this thesis that
might be interesting is the liability of the owner to an accident involving a
bystander or passers-by.
Finally, the recent cases establishing extended indemnity have opened
up the potential for contracts that make the owner invulnerable to liability.
Determining the structure and wording of suitable clauses looks particularly
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9B0P8 1926.500-502. 1926.750 & 1 926.450 - 451
Floors, platforms > 6' drop — rail & toeboards
Will openings ( < 3' above floor) > 4' drop — nils or covers
Runway > 4' drop — rail and toeboards
Roof > 1 6 drop — safety warning lines or belts
Floor openings (I min.) rail/toeboards or secured cover
Outer > 25' drops — safety net (8' extension) or leap floor < 30' below
Scaffolds (> 10' high) — rails and toeboards (plus aidrails if mobile)
plants; 2 vide, with wire mesh (on sides) if vorters below
xueniCAL i926.4oo - 404. 1926.954 & 1926.300-304
All electrical equipment grounded
Grounding circuits — fault protected
Power tools — 'assured* grounding program or GO
Moving parts — all covered or guarded
Live parts — all guarded, covered if > 50 V.
InTlOTOO SSS70I9IBI1.ITII8
.50(f). 1926.150
1926.16. .20. .21. .23. .24. .28. .32(j).
OSHA notices — posted, incl. 200/ann. survey Feb-Mar.
Accident logs — maintained, incl OSHA 200
Emergency phone »'s — posted
Site safety plan — posted
First aid equipment — must provide
Instruction (general) ~ must provide
Pen. safety equip — must require it to be worn
Fin alarms/system — must provide & metbod/systea posted.
Fire protection — must provide. I exi. or hose per 3000 SF (L MAX -
100' • l/floor min. l/(adj) stairway 1/ flammable ( 5 *"s
or 5 gals) site w/in 50'.
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raiaaonAL fsoTicTioi 1926.100- 104 & 1926.32
Hardbau -- 'whenever there is a danger..."
Shoes -- 'must comply...*
Hearing proL -- 'wnen required' (measurement needed)
Eye & face proc — joggles when chipping, grinding, chem opt..
or machining; Welders eq. when welding or w/molten metals
Safety belts - lifelines 3/4". safety lines 1/2' or equiv.
NCT 6" drop w/fall
LA99K39 1926.450
t
Length -- single: 30'. double: 24° maximums
Extension past landing — 36' minimum or grab rails
Secured or blocked — required
NONE horizontal
U! I101H11? of the site 1926.52. .56. .250. .252
Illumination — generally 5 ft candles
Sound levels — general (3 hr.) 90 dBA maximum
Heating/Ventilation — must be "adequate*
Debris — oust be clear in work areas, passage-fays and stairways
Gas cylinders — stored and secured in upright position
Horseplay — specifically prohibited in work areas
Nails — turned down or moored ( oust be removed if stacked)
Sucking — Bags: cross key & step back if > 10 high
Bricks: max. 7' high, tapered > 4 high
Masonry: tapered > 6' bigh
Umber. 1 6' high max.
Placement (ail): not w/ln 6' of hoist or 10' of edges
Chutes — required for disposal drops > 20'
n.AMHAML13 1926.152
5 gal. or 5" — fire ext or hose w/in 50"
25 gal. * — separate storage, secured to prevent toppling and/or
sliding
All — storage areas must be marked with flammables sign(s)
TSIBCiai 1926.650 - 652
Exits — w/in 20 If if • or > 4' deep
Shoring — "sufficient to protect* if • or > 5° deep or slope to angle
of repose or greater.
Placement of material — not w/in 2 of edges
R.O.T. for repose -- rock: 90 deg., comp. gravel: 63 deg.. Avg.: 45
deg . Comp sharp sand- 33 deg . Looke sand- 26 deg
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WELDING: see 1926.350 -.354
DIVING: see 1910.401 -/HI
RIGGING: see 1926.257
ROLLOVER : generally required but see 1926.1000




Asbestos 1926.58 & 1910.1001
Benzidine 1910.1010
bis Chloromethy 1 Ether 1 9 1 0. 1 008
Coal Tar Pitch Voiatiles 1910.1002
Coke Oven Emissions 1910.1029
Cotton Dust 1910.1043
l,2Dibromo-3-Chloropropane 1910.1044
3,3 Dichlorobenzidine 19 1 0. 1 007
Ethylamine 1910.1012
Inorganic Arsenic 1910.1018
Methyl Chloromethyl Ether 1910.1006
alpha-Naphthylaxnine 1910.1004








DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF THE SAFETY SURVEY
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This appendix covers the development of the safety survey and the
procedures the author used in employing it to record safety data. The
author attaches particular emphasis to the two different methods of data
definition mentioned in the notes on usage.
Notes on the Development of the Safety Survey
Development of the Safety Survey Form required about six weeks. This
included some time spent visiting and selecting the sites that would be used.
It was crucial to the organization of the form that the selected sites had
ongoing work that would provide a broad basis for investigating OSHA
requirements.
Development Chronology and Site Selection
The author met with contract administration representatives of the
Office of Physical Plant (OPP) of Penn State University. In these meetings
the currently active sites and the purpose of this thesis effort were
discussed. A tour of all the sites was conducted and four sites, based on job
size and expected activity, were chosen for the survey.
Three sites were under the direct administration of the University staff.
One was under the administration of the Director of General Services (DGS). a
branch of the state government in Pennsylvania. In this case, DGS
functioned as a prime contractor to the university and had a contractor-
owner relationship with OPP. However, the DGS contract also included a
provision for DGS to acquire a deed to the real property under construction
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which had the effect of making the owners inspection staff "guests" of DGS,
who operated with an inspection staff of it's own.
The four sites selected were the largest, under contract, during the
survey period which included July and August 1989. Large, active sites
were preferred in order to have a broad data base for sampling. The author
desired as many potential safety hazards, as possible, be present in the
study. This was intended to avoid inadvertently skewed data if one
particular type of hazard was prevalent.
The four sites chosen were a new multi-story Agricultural Sciences
academic building, a new multi-story food services building, a new parking
garage and a major, campus-wide utilities rehabilitation project.
Safety Survey Form Development Goals
A new safety survey form was developed independently by the author
for use in this study. Existing forms appeared to be either too cumbersome
or ineffective in providing data that would address the questions being
investigated by this work. A copy of the form is provided in appendix A.
The survey form was based upon several sources that identified the
"worst." or "most numerous," or "most often observed." or "most often cited"
safety hazards. It is the existence of these hazards, the well known,
publicized and often lethal mistakes that had to be identified. Their




Safety Survey Form Information Sources
The author started with a compendium of published safety checklists.
These included the "Violations Most Often Noted," a 10-item checklist,
published by the Western Pennsylvania Building Construction Industry
under their Construction Advancement Program (CAP) of Western
Pennsylvania, the "Job Site Safety Check List." a 24-item check list, published
by the joint safety committee representing both CAP and the Pittsburgh
Building Trades Council, AFL/CIO, and the "General Safety Rules," a 16-item
list, also published jointly by the Western Pennsylvania Building
Construction Industry, CAP, and the AFL/CIO. To these were added
significant safety concerns noted in both the Penn State, OPP "Proposed
Safety Program" (a handout for contractors who request guidance) and Penn
State Department of Civil Engineering report No. 15, A Self Study Guide:
Construction Safety Management and Control (Jack Willenbrock and
Constantine Plassaras. 1982). Also added were items listed in several OSHA-
published "top 10 items cited" lists found in various pamphlets and one 15-
item OSHA-based checklist of unknown origin. Additionally, the author
referenced three OSHA-published "Fatal Facts" accident reports and a 25-
item checklist entitled "Construction's Most Serious Citations." based on OSHA
reports, published in Vol. 13, No. 5. May 1989 issue of the Associated
Builders and Contractors. Inc. Safety News. Finally, the author also
referenced the 1 1 page, 100+ item "Original Site Safety Inspection Form"
prepared by Naoto Narahara in his thesis (1988, p.101). This was partially
to add to the completeness of the data sheet being developed. More
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importantly, the author tried to avoid an approach that would create a
mammoth document unsuited for field use
Final Development of the Safety Survey Form
The above lists were organized into categories of similar hazard type
and the complete collection was researched in OSHA publication 2207 (CFR
1 9 1 and 1 926 as of 1 987) and the 1 988 and 1 989 updates of CFR 1 9 1 and
1926 published separately.
The OSHA references provided the standards for all the hazards
generated by the various lists and suggested further refinements to the
classification categories that had been developed. However, as noted on the
form itself the categories were not organized along the exact categories that
OSHA used and several categories reference OSHA standards from multiple
sections.
A mnemonic was developed that reasonably fit the 8 categories.
Anyone who has ever watched a baseball game and heard a long flyball
characterized as being hit to "deep left, center or right field" will find that
the "D.E.E.P. L.E.F.T." pnemonic is easily recalled and quickly translates to
the categories of Drops (falls), Electrical, Employer (responsibilities). Personal
Protection, Ladders, Environment, Flammables and Trenches. The pnemonic
was designed to speed the author s use of the form which even at only 3
pages was still viewed as rather cumbersome for field purposes.
The form was divided into two parts. The first two pages contained the
checklist with the 8 categories, including the OSHA standards. A third page
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listed several special case items and the complete Hazardous Materials listing
fromCFR 1910.
Notes on the Use of the Safety Survey
Each of the four sites was scheduled to be visited approximately 3 times
a week for 3 weeks generating a total of 36 site visits. The actual average of
visits was slightly below three per week so the study period ended up being
just under four weeks long (July 21st to August 17th).
The D.E.E.P. L.E.F.T. Checklist
During each site visit the work was surveyed using the two pages of the
D.E.E.P. L.E.F.T. checklist. Each item in the checklist was completed as
appropriate to the individual site. The boxes on the left hand side were used
to record either number of observations and number of observed violations,
or number of men observed (related to the item in question) and the
number of men at risk or in violation. The exact format used for each line
item was largely dependent on the situation as it existed at the site and is
usually self-explanatory. Where it was not. amplifying notes were recorded
directly on the form.
A useful example of this process is to consider an upper story deck with
improper toe boards and/or railings on some but not all sides. With no one
working on the deck the procedure used was to record the total number of
"sides" observed as requiring railings and also the number of "sides" that
were improperly protected. This data could then generate a percentage of
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proper protection for that item. If there were men working in the area, then
the total number of workers and the number of workers at risk, because of
the lack of proper protection, was recorded.
Recording "numbers of workers at risk" sounds somewhat subjective
but in practice it was so clearly the superior method, that it became the
author's choice whenever it was made possible by the work being conducted.
These basic processes of data collection were used for all line items.
The Third Page of the Safety Survey Form
The third sheet of the form was not very useful. Diving was not
applicable at any of the sites visited. Rollover protection was checked the
first time on site and whenever a new machine was observed but no lack of
compliance was ever noted.
Welding was conducted in all cases by very qualified sub -contractors.
The time spent to check on the details did not produce any definite
violations and was inefficient compared to what a similar investment of time
produced on more general concerns.
Rigging was similar to welding with the added difficulty that when not
in active use. loads were usually suspended in the air beyond reach making
them hard to inspect. When in use, the loads were not inactive long enough
to get close, negating attempts to measure anything.
Finally, the hazardous materials list was useless because well marked
containers were not in evidence. When an original container was near
enough to the workers to verify it as the source, the author found that there
was insufficient data either available or still readable on it for a
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determination to be made. Quite possibly a trained or more qualified
observer may know the constituent ingredients in some cases and therefore
find such a list useful. But in the course of this investigation, the author
found no instance of documented evidence in the field of any of the listed
items, although the author remained convinced that some were probably in
evidence, considering the work that was in progress.
The right hand side of the form was used to record notes and general
observations. The area provided with the line was specifically used to
record a subjective assessment of the category as a whole on that visit. This
helped to reconstruct the situation observed when the data was being
reviewed later.
Each site visit was approximately 45 minutes long. This varied
depending on circumstances. The major variant was the type and amount of
work being performed at the site. Additionally, as familiarity increased with
the form and with each site, the author found that slightly less time was
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Findings of the Safety Survey
Each of the 4 sites are discussed below, without identification, as sites A,
B, C & D, to cover some site specific general findings. Following that, each
category, from the survey, is discussed, separately, in detail, considering all
the sites as a whole.
General Survey Observations by Site
Site A
This was the most interesting from a safety standpoint. The work
involved all trades and progressed steadily. A major portion of the work
involved upper stories, exposed roofs, scaffolding, floor openings and wall
openings. Throughout the study there were problems with safety in all
these areas but the problems were not consistent.
The site superintendent met with the author on each of the first three
visits for longer than any other site superintendent, but by the end of the
study period was actively avoiding the author. Hard hats were in evidence
on approximately 60% of the workers, initially, but had become extinct by
the fourth week. Hard hats were the subject of jokes in the first week but
not thereafter. This site, alone amongst the others, allowed sneakers to be
worn on site regularly and allowed junk and debris to become piled in
random locations, were it remained.
This site had a labor problem brewing which separated the workers into
at least three camps. Until the authors role was proven to be non-punitive.
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some hostility was felt. Conversely, this site also had the most friendly
workers encountered during the course of the study. This was particularly
evident among those who were obviously counted upon by the
superintendent to do most of the riskier upper level work, usually without
even minimal safety protection. From their comments, the author believes
that they enjoyed the status of that role and would have been less content if
the safety measures, they so cheerfully ignored, had been in place.
SiteB
This site involved earthwork and trenching. It had the most immediate
and real danger to the workers.
Most of the survey form was not applicable at this site. However, two
parts that were applicable were the trenches themselves and the runways
across the trenches for pedestrian traffic. The runways were done with
attention to every detail of the OSHA regulations including the mesh below
the railings. They were the best example of proper OSHA protection against
falls at any of the sites. Denied access to this site, except for public
thoroughfares, it was only because of the existence of these bridging
runways that the author was able to gather full data here.
The trenches however, were improperly and dangerously shored from
the start of the study. Discussions with the supervisor and the state
appointed inspector revealed a callous disregard for this safety item.
Discussions with several workers in the trenches revealed attitudes of
fatalism, disgust and trapped helplessness. The trenches were never
properly shored but following some inquiry, by the author, at offices outside
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the job site itself, partial improvements were put in place as the study
concluded.
Of particular note was the reaction of the workers who had originally,
candidly discussed the shoring problem. Without exception, they exited the
trench and left the immediate area, at the authors approach, during both of
the two remaining site visits following the placement of additional shoring.
SiteC
This site was the most professionally run and the most safety conscious.
This site enforced a visitor check-in and brief. The site superintendent
requested a copy of each survey and the author noted that items marked as
violations were often corrected by the next visit.
The one exception to the overall excellent safety posture was the upper
deck work which continuously had a crew that was three days ahead of the
protective railings, etc. Like site A above, these workers did not appear to
want to change their methods and displayed pride in their confidence in
themselves and in each other, doing what were probably the riskiest jobs on
the site.
Requirements for personal equipment, notices and paperwork were
rigorously adhered to and enforced personally by the superintendent. The
management desired to use the presence of the author as an "OSH A
inspection" and passed word to that effect. For several visits after that no
conversation was possible with any worker. However, several workers
eventually confronted the author about the issue and upon hearing the truth,
about the survey's purpose, seemed relieved. Normal conversations with the
workers resumed by the next visit but interestingly, the crew foremen
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became less cooperative from that point on. This site remained the most
clean and workmanlike of all four sites throughout the study time period.
SiteD
Site D was remarkable for some management decisions involved in it's
design but had the least impact on this study. Concurrently, the authors
presence appeared to have the least effect on both the management
individuals and the workers.
The author talked briefly with the site superintendent about every
third visit but it was usually limited to general pleasantries. Even when
specific items were discussed, the prevailing attitude was casual interest
without follow-through. The author felt pleasantly invisible whenever he
was at this site. OSHA violations were low, primarily as a result of having
neither significant trenching or multi-story work to do. When compared to
the other sites in the remaining categories site D ranked ahead of sites A & B
and behind site C.
Survey Results by D.E.E.P. L.E.F.T. Category
Drops
This category included floor and wall openings, runways, scaffolding,
and most other situations where a worker might fall far enough to be injured
with the exception of ladders. Generally, these areas required railings and
toeboards, covers or safety warning lines. Of 56 observed "sides" of
platforms or floors with drops of greater than 6 feet, 3 1 were observed to be
in violation. Usually this was due to missing rails and/or toeboards. An
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additional 52 men. of an observed 63 total, were counted working on floors
or platforms without proper rails and toeboards in place.
Wall openings were present in abundance at one site and were initially
unprotected with falls up to an estimated 30 feet outside them. During the
study, protection was temporarily applied to an eventual maximum of 6 of
the 10 wall openings. The protection was subsequently ripped down leaving
only 2 of 14 wall openings at this site protected. Two other sites had minor
problems with this, and in both cases applied protection to these areas by
the study's finish.
On finished roofs, a total of 9 workers were observed working without
safety warning lines or other measures. 100% of all roofs that had work
performed on them during this study were unprotected as were all workers
observed on them.
Runways were rare and tended to be temporary at three of the sites
with 10 of 10 workers observed on unprotected runways and only 1 of 9
empty runway observations revealing protection in compliance with OSHA.
The fourth site, however, had 7 runways in place with 6 completely and
properly protected. The seventh was torn down by the second visit and
from then on all the runways at this site remained in strict compliance
despite high use.
Floor openings were properly protected in 66.7% (10 of 15) of the
observed instances. Openings less than 8 inches maximum were neglected
from tabulation, although OSHA includes criteria even for openings down to
one inch.
Scaffolding was a major problem on both sites that used them routinely;
22 of the 25 observed scaffold sections were not in compliance. When
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workers were counted, 64 of an observed 73 workers were working on
improperly protected or constructed scaffolding. From just this category
alone, in just under four weeks, 135 workers were observed working in
prozimity to an improperly protected place where they could experience an
injurious or fatal fall.
As a practical matter, the survey need go no further as this alone
proves the foundation assumptionthat there is a need for research in this
area. The remainder of the survey is discussed below.
Electrical
This category was a contender for the title "least useful category".
There were three instances of unguarded moving parts where guards had
clearly been removed or tied back on power saws, but other than that the
author found himself unable to adequately determine if a violation existed.
Asking the workers produced no answers and if it didn't have a violation,
identifiable by the author, observed electrical equipment was counted as
being in compliance.
Employer Responsibilities
Without notable exception, whatever was in place at the start of the
survey was exactly what remained in place until the end. This was true at
all four sites.
Only one site had a complete board with most items posted, first aid kit
visible and readily available, safety training held weekly and required logs
maintained. Of the remaining sites. 2 had old worn bulletin boards with a
couple random, faded notices posted that appeared to have been there for
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several jobs or perhaps years. The last site had nothing posted and made no
observable effort to meet even the easiest standards.
The author was aware that he was observed, by each site
superintendent, studying the boards and writing comments. However, only
the site that was already very much in compliance had a superintendent
who took the time to ascertain what possible violations were found there.
Personal Protection
This category really showed the effectiveness of the the superintendent
in promoting safety on site. On the site where hard hats, safety shoes, eye
protection and face protection were required, there was 100% compliance
with hard hats and safety shoes and no instance of eye or face protection
violations being repeated over 2 site visits.
At the site where hard hats were a joke item, compliance with hard hat
requirements dropped from an early "high" of 71 % to the point where hard
hats were observed on fewer than 15% of the applicable workers, along with
7 recorded observations of tennis shoes where safety shoes should have
been worn and 13 observations (out of 23) where eye protection was
missing. The other two sites were in between for these items.
All sites had problems with hearing protection but this is a subjective
assessment by the author as measurements were not taken. Additionally
there were 32 recorded instances of an individual working on or over the
side, above a 6 foot or greater drop, without a safety belt or safety line.




There were no recorded instances of excessive length or horizontal use
of ladders. However, of the 84 ladders observed during this study. 31 did
not extend 36 inches past the landing (or have grabrails) and 58 were
completely unblocked and unsecured. That is 69% of all ladders observed on
site during this survey were ( by OSHA standards) potentially able to topple
or slide when in use.
In practice the actual danger is somewhat lower. The author personally
tested each ladder recorded as an observation and while several felt very
unstable, the majority, due largely to their own weight or perhaps their
height/own weight ratio, felt sturdy and useable even though unblocked and
unsecured.
Environment
Illumination, sound levels, heating/ventilation, debris accumulation and
horseplay were subjective in nature. Measurements were not made and
generally conditions appeared to be adequate. Debris accumulation was the
most noted of these items.
At one site, there was a considerable problem with lighting, sound
levels and ventilation. This occurred while laying asphalt courses in the
already enclosed lower level. It received minimal attention from the site
superintendent.
Nails left in boards were a problem when debris was gathering, but
three of the four sites controlled this hazard well. Stacking was usually not
applicable, and when it was the delivery crews were responsible for the
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stacks that were in violation. The construction crews usually just left the
stacks be and eventually they were used up and the problem disappeared.
Chutes were needed at one site and were never installed. The author
observed several instances of debris being thrown through wall and floor
openings a distance of approximately 25-30 feet, or more, to the ground with
ground level workmen in close proximity to the impact points.
Flammables
This was the least useful category. Flammables were generally not used
at any of the sites during this study. More importantly, even when the
author believed that flammable materials were in use, it was impossible to
make a verifiable determination of that fact from the containers present or
the knowledge of the workmen involved. For this category to produce
effective results a more properly trained observer is required.
Trenches
Of the 4 sites, 3 had only temporary trenches. Usually only 1 or 2 that
satisfied the depth requirements for consideration. However, without
exception all of these trenches were in violation in some way.
The fourth site was primarily a trenching and utilities installation
project. This site was in major violation and unsafe throughout the study.
The trenches at this site did not have proper exits; at one point only one
existed for an entire block-length run.
These trenches were improperly shored without lateral support and
sheeting only extending part of the way up the trench wall vertically. Many
sections were unbraced and unsecured with unconnected sections of
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plywood as thin as 3/16". Initially over 50% of the trench length was totally
unshored. Where it was "shored" many of the plywood sheets were just
leaned against the trench wall, resting, without any further effort being
applied to installation. It was evidently intended to create the appearance of
bracing to a distant or casual observer.
These conditions improved somewhat when outside attention was
directed at this job site. However, the improvements were modest in scope
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Floors, platforms > 6' drop — rail & toeboards
Wall openings ( < 3' above floor) > 4' drop — rails or covers
Runway > 4' drop — rail and toeboards -Is*"*
Roof > 1 6 drop — safety warning lines or belts
Floor openings (I mm.) rail/toeboards or secured cover
Other > 25' drops — safety net (« extension) or temp floor < 30' below
,
Scaffolds (> 10' high) — rails and toeboanls (plus asidrails if mobile) >-
planks; 2 wide, with wire mesh (on sides) if workers below
v /".'• > t 2y n ' a-") ***tu *j> Ilk
IiSCTa!CAL 1926.400 - -404. 1926.954 & 1926.300-304
All electrical equipment grounded
Grounding circuits — fault protected
£•
'
/v" 'Power tools — 'assured ' grounding program or GCI
Moving parts — all covered or guarded
Live parts — all guarded, covered if > 30 V.
IsWLOTIB BISVOI9I1IL1TIIS
.50(f). 1926.150















OSHA notices — posted, incl. 200/ann. survey Feb-Har.
Accident logs — maintained, Incl OSHA 200
Emergency phone *'s — posted
Site safety plan — posted
First aid equipment — must provide
Instruction (general 1 — must provide
Pen. safety equip — must require it to be worn
Fire alarms/system — must provide & method/system posted.
Fire protection — must provide. I ext or hose per 3000 SF (L MAX
100' l/floor min. I /(adj) stairway 1/ flammable ( 5 '









PIBIOIAL PBOTICTIOI 1926.100- 104 k 192632
Hardhats — "whenever there is a danger...' I
1* /o
Shoes — "mint comply . ' ^/Oo*)*
Hearing prot. — 'vbea required' (measurement ttgeded)
/ / Eye A (ice prot — goggles when <fnp£iQ4/tnnd^i4. cheat ops.
or machining; Welders eq when welding or */ molten metals
Safety belts — lifelines 3/4". safely lines 1/2" or equiv.











Length -- single: 30'. double: 24' maximums
X Extension put landing — 36' minimum or grab rails


















IIVIBOIHIIT of the site 1926.52. .56. .250. .252
Illumination ~ generally 5 ft candles
Sound levels — general (S hr.) 90 dBA maximum
Heating/Ventilation ~ must be 'adequate'
J- tt ii Debris — must be clear in wort areas, passageways and stairways
Gas cylinders -- stored and secured in upright position
Horseplay — specifically prohibited in work areas
Nails -^turned <iowT)or removed ( must be removed if stacked) &.J-J'•
Stacking — Bags: cross key & step back if > 10 high
Bricks: max. 7 high, tapered > 4 high
Masonry: tapered > 6' high
Lumber: 1 6' high max.
Placement (all): not w/in 6' of hoist or 10' of edges
Chutes — required for disposal drops > 20'
FLAHMABLIf 1926.152
5 gal. or 5' — Nre ext or hose w/in 50'
25 gal. * — separate storage, secured to prevent toppling and/or
sliding
All — storage areas must be marked with flammables sign(s)










Exits — w/in 20 If if - or > 4 deep
Shoring— 'sufficient to protect' If • or > 5' deep or slope to angle i. cl /•«
of repose or greater.
Placement of material — not w/in 2 of edges
R.O.T. for repose — rock: 90 deg., comp. gravel: 63 deg .. Avg.: 45 6,. . * ~
deg
.





DEFINITIONS OF SOME LEGAL TERMS
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The following list of definitions are the author's own
working understanding of these terms. The definitions relate
specifically to the thesis topic and are not intended to be
legal quotations. They are provided as a courtesy to the reader.
Agency - The principle that allows an employees actions to have the full
force and effect that would have applied if the employee's boss had
performed them personally
Cause of Action - In layman's terms it is the same thing as "having a
case." It is an item that one party alleges the other party is guilty of.
At least one item must be identified in order to proceed with a
legal action.
Citation - This has two meanings. The first indicates that a case was
referenced. The second meaning is the format for documenting a case
that is referenced. The format is always of the form, "volume,
series, page number." The year may be included but that varies with
the source.
Common Law - The principles of law based on the rights to redress that
all individuals have. Most of these principles appear to date back to
conventions established in English law.
Contravention - Contrary to or in opposition to something. The use of this
term allows a slightly different sentence structure.
Derogation - Similar to Contravention except it implies opposition sufficient
to reduce the status of the opponent.
Indemnification - A legal principle that allows contractual language to
leave one party the burden of paying for judgements against the other
party.
Negligence - Hard to define. See the discussion in Chapter 3. Briefly, it
concerns actions that a jury rules were not those that would have
been taken by a reasonable man.
Subrogation - A legal principle that allows the party which paid the
compensation to try and recover that amount from a negligent third
party that was also involved in the accident.
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Tort Action - A lawsuit where one party claims a right to restitution based
on another party's negligence.
Trespass - Terminology used by some Pennsylvania judges in their
decisions when referring to a specific type of tort action. This
refers to trespass on rights not the commonly used connotation of
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